

Marine Corps Gazette

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Marine Corps Gazette

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THIS MONTH'S COVER was designed by TSgt D. W. Kiser.

Last week a fellow Marine pointed out to us that one letter published in the Message Center, more than pays for a one-year subscription to the GAZETTE. Two such letters more than cover the cost of a three-year subscription. We would like to add to that, and point out that the average four-page article pays you enough to buy that new set of gabardines and a pair of shell cordovan shoes. A point to remember about all this is the fact that you don't have to be a professional or even polished writer.

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read'i-ness: *when a fighter as new as tomorrow is in service with the Fleet today*

There's a bright, new glint to our Fleet today.

Chance Vought's 1,000-plus-mph *Crusader* has arrived — in strength! This potent fighter was designed a champion — in speed, ceiling and firepower. It was engineered, too, for swift production and for smooth introduction to pilots.


This sped the *Crusader* to duty faster than any modern jet. It brought to the Fleet in an age of peril a *weapon that will hold its edge*.

With the *Crusader* comes a new realm of four-figure speeds. Already, Navy and Marine pilots have used its

performance to smash major world's records. Their unprecedented supersonic and carrier-to-carrier crossings of the U. S. signal a new chapter in manned aircraft speed and mobility.

Today, squadrons of *Crusaders* sweep the skies above the seas. Their trophy-winning performance adds unmatched combat strength to America's power for peace.

CHANCE **VOUGHT AIRCRAFT**
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NAA is at work in the fields of the future



On these three men depends America's conquest of Outer Space


Very soon now an American is going to ride a rocket ship to the edge of space—and back.

The success of this first flight—and of the others that will follow—depends on the teamwork of the men who build the rocket ship, the men who become its ground-support technicians, and the men who form its air crew. For only the closest coordination of America's industrial, technical, and military skills can achieve the conquest of space.

The X-15: Space Ship No. 1

The craft that is being readied for this first flight into space is the X-15, a rocket-powered research plane for the Air Force, Navy, and National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics. So advanced in design it might be called a manned missile, it's the forerunner of the craft that will cruise through Outer Space.

The assignment to design, build, and test the X-15 is being carried out by North American.



Reliability Room. Automatic control systems for America's manned and unmanned weapon systems must do their critical tasks with unfailing reliability. Even a tiny fleck of dust might impair their vital accuracy. That is why Autonetics assembles its control systems with surgical precision in this dust-free room.

Planes, brains and rockets

North American's key role in this great drive to put man into space is the result of its capabilities in the new technologies that make such a flight possible.

In supersonic aircraft, North American has had more experience than all other companies combined. In automatic controls—the electronic “brains” that will guide and navigate the X-15—its Autonetics Division has pioneered some of the most significant advances in recent years. Its Missile Development Division—pioneer of America's missile technology—is at work on an advanced air-to-ground (or space-to-earth) missile for the Air Force. And, in rocket propulsion, NAA's Rocketdyne Division is already delivering the great engines for America's major missiles—Atlas and Thor for the Air Force...Jupiter and Redstone for the Army.

After the breakthrough

These divisions of North American are making many important scientific breakthroughs in this race to space. But even more important is the ability North American has demonstrated, time and again, to turn today's experimental flights into tomorrow's standard weapon system

—swiftly, surely, and at lowest possible cost. For every breakthrough is only a new beginning; it's the *followthrough* that gets the results.

Ground support for space

One of the Armed Services' most difficult problems in the Space Age will be the increasing workload on their expensively trained technical manpower. That is why North American is designing a new kind of simplified maintenance into all airplanes, components, and automatic control systems.


This program will pay off in three ways: more efficient use of special skills; more complete utilization of weapons; more defense for the taxpayer's dollar.

In the arts of peace, NAA's Atomics International Division has developed two nuclear reactors that show great promise as practical sources of electric power.

Today in North American Aviation and its divisions, you'll find as potent a combination of scientists, engineers, and production men as any in American industry. Because these men are constantly forging ahead into vital new technologies, much of their work holds great promise for science and industry.




Destination: Outer Space. A man will soon look out on space from cockpit of the X-15, rocket-powered research plane now being readied for its flight test.



Rocket Power. NAA's Rocketdyne Division builds rocket engines with thrust to drive Air Force's Atlas missile—or to launch an earth-circling satellite.

NORTH AMERICAN AVIATION, INC.

SERVING THE NATION'S INTEREST FIRST—THROUGH THESE DIVISIONS



LOS ANGELES

AUTONETICS

MISSILE DEVELOPMENT

ROCKETDYNE

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Los Angeles, Canoga Park, Downey, California; Columbus, Ohio; Neosho, Missouri



The AmTracs Protest

... Reading Capt Donald J. Loughlin's letter "A Tanker Protests," (GAZETTE: Nov '57) I can only say "How True." We are faced with the same problem here in AmTracs and I believe that all mechanized units in the Marine Corps have the same problem. The big question is: "What can you do?" This maintenance problem also holds true for the communications equipment in the vehicles and there aren't enough hours in a day to go to all the required schools and keep all the gear in/on an expensive machine, such as an AmTrac, in tip-top shape.

The solution which I would like to offer is this: Hold a quarterly military subjects test on company level. This has 2 advantages, it gives a written account of a man's knowledge of military subjects, which could be used in figuring his mark on his individual training record, and only those men who did not pass the tests would be schooled until they did pass the test. The remaining men are available to perform the required preventive maintenance and repairs.

Here's hoping somebody does something about a very big problem.

SSGT M. N. SHWETZER

1st Am Trac Bn, 3d Mar Div
FPO, San Francisco, Calif.

A German Officer Speaks

... Upon receipt of your reminder to the renewal of the subscription of THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE I wish to express my firm interest in the continuation of my membership and the further delivery of this excellent periodical.

By the same date I have mailed a request to my home banking office in Munich, Germany for the immediate transfer of \$ 15.— to your address in order to secure my membership to the MARINE CORPS ASSOCIATION for the next 3 years.

Though this statement will arrive at your office some days in advance of the money, I hope that no delay will be caused in the further delivery of the GAZETTE.

I'm a reader of the GAZETTE since 1955, and it gives me great pleasure to thank you for the prompt and regular shipment of this valued paper through all the years.

In addition, I wish to express my full recognition and appreciation to the discussion of military problems of particular interest, and to your famous organization which, I believe, doesn't have any parallel, at the present time.

From my personal experience with some of your outstanding Marine Corps officers during the postwar time, I feel sorry that there are only a few but rare opportunities over here in Germany to establish a more personal contact and to discuss some more professional problems in detail.

With kind regards and the best wishes for a good and successful 1958 I remain,
Yours sincerely,

MAJ HELMUT DÜRR

Bad Godesburg, Germany

A Civilian Marine

... First I would like to make a comment about the new book now on sale at the GAZETTE Bookshop U. S. Marine Corps Operations in Korea, Vol III; this book gives an excellent account of one of the greatest military epics of our times. It is heart warming to both Marines and civilians who have read it.

After serving with the 1st Mar Div during the dark hours of the beginning of the Korean incident and later participating in the first helicopter landing with Recon Co on hill 884 (Sept '51) I have often said to myself "if we only had the helicopter with us at Chosin it would have made the situation most favorable to us."

As to the article *American Military Policy and Communist Unorthodox Warfare* (GAZETTE: Jan '58) it should be remembered that in Korea the Marines were successful in checking enemy guerrilla tactics by winning the co-operation from the local inhabitants of Majon-ni and Andong. This should also prove that it is most important to have the local civilians on your side.

PAUL G. MARTIN

Kew Gardens, N. Y.

A Pleasant Surprise

... I have just finished reading the letters contained in the Observation Post for the January issue of the GAZETTE. I was pleasantly surprised to find a discussion of certain aspects of the Marine Corps which are in the least controversial and at the most enlightening. The 3 letters contained therein were quite refreshing as compared to the material that has normally appeared in this publication.

I feel that this type of material should not be relegated to the Observation Post but should be used for lead articles. The Editorial Board could do well to look at these letters with a view toward revising their editorial policy to accept similar articles for publication.

If this were done I am sure there would be more writers and many more articles submitted for publication.

More controversial and enlightening articles will convince Marines that the GAZETTE is their magazine and truly "provides a forum for the expression of matters which will advance knowledge, interest and esprit in the Marine Corps" and that the "opinions expressed in the GAZETTE do not necessarily reflect the attitude of the Navy Department nor of Headquarters, United States Marine Corps."

LT COL C. E. EARLY

MCEC, MCS, Quantico, Va.

ED: We are pleased that our editorial material meets with LtCol Early's approval, and we will continue to strive for thought-provoking articles and letters. We assure LtCol Early—and our other readers—that all contributions are carefully considered both by the Editor and the Editorial Board.

Our Canadian Allies

... I have subscribed to the GAZETTE for a number of years and the GAZETTE has been very useful in keeping us up to date in tactics and ordnance items. Probably most important of all, the spirit of the Corps expressed through the medium of the GAZETTE has raised the morale in our organization.

If they ever attempt to lessen the independence of the Marine Corps, I'll be down to join in the fight even if I am a foreigner.

Best Wishes for 1958.

W. E. WHITE

Director, Instruments & Electronics,
Canadian Arsenal, Ltd.

(Continued on page 6)

★
The GAZETTE will pay \$5.00 for each letter published in Message Center
★

What is the Bell System?

The Bell System is wires and cables and laboratories and manufacturing plants and local operating companies and millions of telephones in every part of the country.

The Bell System is people . . . hundreds of thousands of employees and more than a million and a half men and women who have invested their savings in the business.

It is more than that. **The Bell System is an idea.**

It is an idea that starts with the policy of providing the best possible telephone service at the lowest possible price.

But desire is not enough. Bright dreams and high hopes need to be brought to earth and made to work.

You could have all the equipment and still not have the service you know today.

You could have all the separate parts of the Bell System and not have the benefits of all those parts fitted together in a nationwide whole.



The thing that makes it work so well in your behalf is the way the Bell System is set up to do the job.

No matter whether it is some simple matter of everyday operation—or the great skills necessary to invent the Transistor or develop underseas telephone cables to distant countries—the Bell System has the experience and organization to get it done.

And an attitude and spirit of service that our customers have come to know as a most important part of the Bell System idea.

Bell Telephone System

(Continued from page 4)

Once A Marine

... "Once a Marine Always a Marine," an oft quoted phrase. Many of you reading this are no longer on active duty with the regulars but are in a good position, should you desire to lend a hand. In many a village and town there is either a Reserve Unit or Regular recruiter and many of these Marines are experiencing a civilian community first hand for the first time since enlisting. They have problems not often encountered in the Regular establishment. A helping hand from one who has served with "The Corps" would make their job much more pleasureable. Several times each year they are confronted with



situations, the success of which takes the combined effort of many. Many have souvenirs or other items which make up part of the history and traditions of "our Corps" which could be used in Marine displays at local or State Fairs. Why not drop in or phone the Marine Corps representative in your area if for no other reason than to say "hello" for you may be just the one to assist him in one of his varied duties.

CAPT C. D. FAY
USMCR Training Center
Phoenix, Arizona

I-I Staff

BGen Stickney has pointed out in his latest article (GAZETTE: Jan '58) the balance that must exist between the Marine Corps Reserve and the Regular Establishment. I believe that a step in the right direction has already been made by reductions in the number of active duty personnel assigned to the Reserve Program. However, this policy has not been extended to the unit level, the Organized Marine Corps Reserve. Reductions made here could be utilized to help maintain the strength of the Regular Establishment, particularly in the training activities of which the General writes.

The first billet that could be eliminated is that of the Assistant Inspector-Instructor. Present tables of organization already provide for a highly qualified senior assistant as I-I Staff sergeant

major. I also believe that the I-I of battalion sized units could be changed from a LtCol to a Maj.

At present the enlisted T/O of a type Charlie battalion calls for 10 Marines and one Navy corpsman. By shifting more functions to Reserve personnel this figure could be reduced to 7 Marine Corps enlisted men. The T/O would then look something like this:

Inspector-Instructor	Major	0302
Sergeant Major	SgtMaj	0399
Supply Chief	MSgt	3049
Comm Chief	TSgt	2529
Training Assistant	SSgt	0369
Admin Clerk	SSgt	0141
Class Clerk	Sgt	0151
Stockman	Sgt	3011
Hospitalman 2d Class (HMC at Present)		

Some of the functions that could be transferred to Reserves are recruiting, the burden of unit administration, clothing records and issue, extra-curricular ceremonies (public relations), and motor vehicle and equipment maintenance. Transfer of these items should also result in actual cost reductions.

1ST LT C. G. PIERCE

1906 Wilton Dr.
New Orleans, La.

100 Per Cent

... I am pleased to inform you that this Bn achieved 100 per cent officer membership in the Marine Corps Association as of 31 Dec 1957.

MAJ JOHN FINN, JR.

2d Bn, 1st Mar, 1st Mar Div
Camp Pendleton, Calif.

ED: Well done and thanks!

Achilles' Heel or Whirling Dervish — Solved

... In reply to Achilles' Heel or Whirling Dervish (GAZETTE: Jan '58) by Maj Glenn L. Rieder.

The Major stated in his article that the present HR2S, Transport Helicopter, because of its role in Vertical Envelopment is vulnerable to both ground and air attack by its passage over enemy lines and positions. His possible solution was to construct a fast flying, armed and armor-protected escort helicopter to protect the Helicopter Transport Convoy by reducing the effectiveness of small arms fire from the ground or the devastation of an air attack on the slower flying troop carriers.

The Kaman Aircraft Corporation has designed an aircraft capable of speeds from 0 to 50 mph and can perform as a fixed wing aircraft at speeds up to 300 mph. It is a propeller driven twin nacelle aircraft that can change the angle of the flaps to deflect the prop wash downward enabling it to hover or execute a vertical take-off.

When this plane is approved for use by the Navy, then the Major's problem will be solved, for it is a combination of the finer points of both the helicopter and conventional fixed wing aircraft.

This new idea in aviation will be capable of attacking both ground and air intruders and with sufficient arms and armor protection, it can meet this threat with success when new tactics are developed for this type of escort plane. The aircraft can operate effectively at low altitudes like the helicopter, and it will not be vulnerable to anti-aircraft artillery fire because it can use most of the tactics now employed by the helicopter. It will be able to engage the enemy on the ground to reduce small arms fire on the Transport Helicopter and when enemy air arrives on the scene this new aircraft can easily change the position of its flaps, increase speed and become a formidable opponent.

The result, all around protection for the helicopters used in the concept of Vertical Envelopment. A drawing of the plane mentioned in this article may be seen in the August 1957 edition of the Marine Corps GAZETTE (page 31).

SSGT R. L. BONIFAY

53d InfCo, USMCR
Charleston, S. C.

... a touch of
tradition

U.S. Marine
Corps



UNIFORM PRINTS


22

different full-color prints of Marine Corps uniforms from 1775 to the present. Identical prints now hang in the Smithsonian Institute. Original paintings were done by LtCol J. H. Magruder, USMCR. Colorful... authentic... suitable for framing, just the thing to dress up your living room or den...

postpaid

\$1

The Marine Corps GAZETTE
Box 1844 Marine Corps School
Quantico, Va.



FORMER OCCUPANT: BACK TO DUTY . . . Nothing galvanizes the Navy into action quicker than the word that a plane is down in the water. A Navy search and rescue operation is amazing in its efficiency and heart-warming in its purpose. To the United States Navy, every man jack who wears the uniform is as important as the last man on earth. Because of this fierce determination to deny Davy Jones at every possible turn, Navy search and rescue teams have written some of the finest chapters in the Navy's proud log . . . and Kaman rescue helicopters have been right there with them . . . ready and waiting.

THE **KAMAN** AIRCRAFT CORPORATION

BLOOMFIELD, CONNECTICUT

The Fleet Air Arm in the Operations at SUEZ

By Cdr Frank W. Lipscomb, O.B.E., R.N. (Ret)

Photos supplied by the author

✿ EVER SINCE THE END OF WWII THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER HAS BEEN RISING IN ESTIMATION IN the naval circles of the Western Powers. Now Mr. Sandys, in his recent White Paper on defense, has acclaimed it the cornerstone of the British Fleet and the ship around which our naval forces of the future will be formed. This White Paper has created history equal to the fundamental change initiated by the launching of the battleship *Dreadnought* before WWI.

In addition the 3 admirals, at present principally responsible for the Fleet Air Arm, have also made important statements on paper which were passed to the public through the medium of the weekly paper *Flight*. In these statements the following words were used.


VAdm A. N. C. Bingley, C.B., O.B.E., said: "What is the Fleet Air Arm? What is it for? What can it do? There is no subject connected with defense about which more people know less. . . . This is wrong. An enlightened democracy should have an understanding of the country's defense problems and an influence on the decisions about the number and kind of weapons it can afford; the difficulty for the ordinary citizen is to get the facts in a form which he finds entertaining and easy to read, and which he can understand."

Adm Sir Caspar John, K.C.B., said: "I have never known the Fleet Air Arm in better heart or better shape than it is today and I judge it to be relatively a far more effective weapon system than it has ever been."


VAdm M. L. Power, C.B., C.B.E., D.S.O., who himself commanded the carriers in the Suez operations, said: "It is perhaps worth stressing that the aircraft carrier contains within her probably the highest level of teamwork that can ever be met. The end product is the aircraft performing its task in the air; but behind that lies a most complex organization interlocking at all points and involving everything from the domestic needs of thousands cramped within a small space through seamen, engineers, electricians, armorers, communications, . . . to finally that epitome of co-ordinated drill, the flight deck and hangar organization.

"Our responsibilities remain world-wide. Our bases, alas, are no longer so. The carriers fill the gap. As Kipling said: 'It is not the





g. De Haese '58



Rocket loaded Sea Hawk takes off from HMS Eagle

big stick that counts, it is the liftable stick.'"

All this was in an untried position until the Suez operations took place, which showed that development had been on the right lines and thus the pattern of the Navy of the future was sealed.

It would be well, therefore, if the public were given an opportunity to know more about the part played by carriers in the Suez operation—code word OPERATION MUSKETEER. This article sets out to fulfill that purpose. The reader is asked to eliminate from his mind the pros and cons of Suez. We are concerned solely with how the aircraft carriers operated and what it was that has convinced students of naval warfare to accept the carrier as the basis of the Navy. In passing, there is a case for bringing to the notice of the public the work of the officers and men who took part, a factor which appears to have been little appreciated at the time, chiefly because it was not easy to expand on such a theme at a time when, in the eyes of the world, the operation in which they took part was both unpopular and disappointing.

Five British carriers took part in the operations. They were the fleet carriers *Eagle*, *Albion* and *Bulwark* operating the fighters, light bombers and army support aircraft and a few

helicopters, and the light fleet carriers *Ocean* and *Theseus* solely operating helicopters. When the operation was ordered it was evident that the loss of all our land bases in the Middle East, except Cyprus, seriously handicapped the air effort necessary to support the Allied Landing Forces. Moreover, Cyprus was too far off to provide continuous close support from its aerodromes. The answer lay in a Carrier Force, with its ability to provide an aerodrome in a given place at short notice, and



its capacity to operate aircraft or varying types capable of carrying out a number of different roles.

On 28 October the carriers were at sea proceeding to take part in an exercise off Cyprus, but it was already clear that the political situation in the Mediterranean was becoming very strained. VAdm Power was flying his flag in *Eagle*. When he was ordered to take action, the situation confronting him was far

from simple. In the tense atmosphere of a major political crisis, conflicting information is one of the headaches of senior officers and this crisis was no exception. Because of the necessity to double-check reports, there are times when commanders hear important news for the first time from the B.B.C. and not from Service authorities; this happened more than once in MUSKETEER. If the general international situation was confusing, so also was the immediate naval outlook. Somewhere in the eastern Mediterranean was a United States Task Force, consisting of ships very similar in character to Adm Power's force. Naturally they could be expected to be operating and therefore, if the 2 forces came within measurable distance, which in fact they did, the chances of a slip in identification even by a single pilot might set off repercussions of the gravest moment. Although the Egyptian surface forces were negligible and unlikely to put to sea very far, it was well within the bounds of possibility that their air force might venture over the water, if only to spread some confusion in an already confused situation. Meanwhile, there was always the haunting uncertainty of what might be going on under the water. Adm Power, having spent many of his early days in submarines, was particularly conscious of this problem. In these days of extreme under-water endurance, "snort" tubes and the like, it was by no means certain that one of the great powers opposed to us politically did not have submarines in the area. The position became really complex when the senior officer of the US Forces warned Adm Power that US submarines were already operating in the area. Unless they moved away it meant that no action could be taken until a torpedo was fired, for fear that a submarine held in contact by anti-submarine forces might be American.

These problems in themselves were enough for any senior officer to sort out but there was another. During this period of tension, US nationals were being evacuated from Egypt. To cover this operation the Americans had sent some ships to Alexandria, and had also informed all countries concerned that convoys of motor cars would be moving from Cairo, past Cairo West Airport and

by desert road to Alexandria. Although these points would not become danger spots until the operation itself was ordered, and this might never be, the evacuation was naturally a considerable worry to the Flag Officer Aircraft Carriers.

What was going on in the mind of their Admiral was unknown to the majority of the officers and ships' companies of the carriers. For them it was a matter of just waiting to know whether they were to be called upon to put into practice the training which they had gone through during the past years. Every man in the ships was concerned with the one object of getting the aeroplanes in the air from their floating aerodromes. To say that there was enthusiasm for this would be an understatement. Life in carriers for the rank and file is not the most popular in the Navy. Because of their size these ships cannot tour the world in the same way as the ships of the Navy used to do. "Join the Navy and see the World" does not apply to carrier life. There are few harbours where these ships can comfortably go alongside and not all that number where they can anchor close to the shore. In consequence, the problem of landing upwards of, say, 1,000 men for shore leave on an afternoon and bringing them off at night is a difficult one to overcome.

It was therefore in the form of the greatest possible compensation to these thousands of highly trained and skilful men, that a chance had come along to show their worth in the profession to which they had given so much time and energy. They had at their disposal Sea Hawks, Sea Venoms, Wyverns and Skyraiders.

As soon as action was ordered, the objects of the operation were explained to the officers and ships' companies, together with the tasks to be carried out by the Carrier Force. There were 3 tasks. First, the neutralization of enemy aircraft on the ground and in the air. Second, attacks against armour, mechanized vehicles and all immediate forms of army support. Third, the close support of the parachute drop and the assault landing. These objects called both for varying methods of attack and arming of the aeroplanes. For the former, the pilots would be ex-



Sea Hawks and Sea Venoms hit Cairo West Airport



Rescued after being shot down, Royal Navy pilot returns to HMS Eagle



Precision bombing of runways at Dakhaila Airfield



Front to rear: HMS Eagle, HMS Bulwark and HMS Albion

exercising the whole range of their technique and for the latter every man in the ship would be required, including cooks and stewards, if there were to be no hold-up.

In the situation obtaining, and one so completely unexpected, briefing air crew, issuing escape and evasion equipment and painting black and yellow recognition stripes on all aircraft, had to be carried out in a very short period.

If anyone still doubted the value of the aircraft carrier, the position was now patently obvious. Here, close at hand to the field of military operations were 3 mobile aerodromes carrying over 100 aircraft with facilities for very rapid turn-round, and ready to emulate the Carrier principle of keeping one-third aircraft airborne.

The physical differences had dictated the separate roles of the Carriers and the Royal Air Force. The Royal Air Force based on Cyprus provided the heavy bomber force operating at great height and briefed to attack targets where inaccuracy of up to 500 yards could be accepted. They flew on pre-planned missions throughout as they could not afford any time in the target area or accept diversion. The Carrier pilots were briefed to attack individual targets,

including gun positions and aerodrome runways and to provide continuous close support of the army when landed. One overriding factor, insisted upon at the highest level, governed operations, namely that casualties must be kept to a minimum and particularly in the case of Egyptian civilians.

At midnight on 30 October the signal to carry out OPERATION MUSKETEER was received in the Carrier Flagship. This signal, in addition to setting in motion the whole flying program, meant that 2 French carriers, *Arromanche* and *LaFayette* came under the orders of Adm Power who stationed them to the northward of his own force and at first allotted to them the role of defense of the Carrier squadrons. This limited task was a disappointment to the French, as so far no Egyptian reconnaissance aircraft had been detected and it appeared that they would have rather a thankless although most necessary task.

From this time the Carrier operations were divided into 2 phases. The first, the period before the army landed and the second the period from the time that the first soldier put his foot on Egyptian soil. The army assault was planned for 6 November with a fluctuating clause,

under the code word "TELESCOPE," which allowed for landing earlier if the situation was favourable.

The 3 British Fleet Carriers *Eagle*, *Albion* and *Bulwark* began their operations early on the morning of Thursday, 1 November. They worked in a staggered cycle. That is to say, first one Carrier flew off a strike, then a second Carrier flew off and finally the third Carrier sent off a strike. It was in this way that the continuous operations were made possible and clearly demonstrated the principle long advocated by Carrier officers that Carriers should not operate separately. Each strike was allowed one hour and five minutes for the round trip. They took off, climbed to 20,000 feet, proceeded to the target losing height all the way, carried out their attack, retired very low until they reached the coast, then climbed to 5,000 feet and finally landed on their parent ship. Every strike was accompanied by fighter protection. This streamlined program was worked out so that personnel both in the air and on board would be employed at their maximum, but it was considered there would be some pauses due to damage to aircraft, enemy opposition and weather. In the event none of

these possible causes affected the operations, still at the end of a day the personnel would undoubtedly be worked to their maximum endurance. Except for the pre-dawn take-off and an occasional landing at dusk or slightly later there were no operations at night.


It was the Egyptian aerodromes which received the first blows and here aircraft were attacked on the ground at Inchas, Bilbeis, Dakhaila and Cairo West. The flak was light and inaccurate on the first day and it was found that by retiring low the anti-aircraft guns were unable to depress sufficiently to hold any serious menace. Over the target the timing of the attack was worked out to seconds, but the high degree of training of the pilots enabled such a tight maneuver to be carried out without fault.

On the evening of 1 November reconnaissance showed that the blockship *Akka* was being moved to the center of the Canal. Attacks were immediately switched to stop this move but although the vessel received a direct hit it did not prevent the ship being sunk in the channel.

By the end of the day most pilots in all 3 Carriers had completed 3 cycles. At first, bearing in mind that the actual flying took only one hour and five minutes, this might appear to be easy going. In practice it is not. First, the briefing takes time and requires considerable concentration of effort so that no misunderstandings can possibly occur. This was specially necessary in view of the minimum casualties order. This might well take an hour. Again, on return it was imperative that pilots described in detail, and at once, exactly what they had done and seen. This, again, might take an hour. Therefore, by carrying out 3 strikes, a pilot would have been "on the go" at high tension for 9 hours.

On the second day of phase one, by mid-day pilots were reporting that there were no targets left on the aerodromes. By now the flak had increased in intensity and accuracy and aeroplanes were getting spattered with holes. Nevertheless, all pilots who realized in time that their allotted targets had already been destroyed gamely asked for another at once.

It was during the morning of 2



November when the squadron suffered its first casualty. One aircraft was hit by flak during the last attack on Almaza airfield, and suffered complete hydraulic failure amongst other things. The pilot made a successful wheels-up landing on deck but his observer was unhappily seriously wounded. His left leg was subsequently amputated above the knee, a fact which did little to destroy his irrepressible spirit. He made a rapid recovery to the extent of becoming a menace to the hospital staff in Nicosia.


With the airfield targets finished, attacks were now switched to military depots and vehicles. Some of the latter were difficult to pinpoint. Many vehicles sheltered between civilian busses on the roads and were consequently left alone. It meant extremely low flying, often near anti-aircraft guns, to get good results and

that the pilots did to such an extent that it was necessary to warn them not to overdo the risks. After all, it was the policy not only to spare as many Egyptians as possible, but to safeguard our own pilots as well.

On Saturday, 3 November, while the attacks on military installations continued, it was also decided to destroy Gamil Bridge. This bridge is the key to Port Said from the westward. It was attacked by Seahawks and Wyverns and finally destroyed. One of the Wyverns was badly hit during these attacks and ditched in the sea right under the guns of Port Said. Although his ship was 70 miles away, the pilot was saved by helicopter, escorted by a heavy covering of fighters.

It was time now to take stock of the situation and the first thing to be done was to fuel the Carriers. Accordingly, each retired in turn to

Results of the attack on Gamil bridge



the northward and fuelled from waiting tankers. Meanwhile, the Admiral altered the operational area to only 40 miles off shore, making it a mere hop to the coast. On board the Carriers the damage to aircraft was being assessed; it was found that the presence of large quantities of birds in the Canal area had done almost as much damage as the flak. At the same time, it became apparent that aircraft had been hit far more times than pilots had suspected. This was sure evidence of the closeness of the attacks and the supreme effort by pilots to achieve accuracy and minimize casualties in the Egyptian population.

All Sunday, the 4th, was devoted to softening up the beaches where the main assault would take place. Here were gun positions, large and small, and numerous military targets, ranging from stores to all manner of hastily erected obstructions.

The 5 days' operations had produced the strongest reactions in the capitals of the world, some for and some against the use of force, and it was imperative from all points of view that the landings should take place as soon as possible. Therefore, OPERATION TELESCOPE was ordered which meant that the British and French paratroops would land at first light on the morning of Monday, 5 November.

The second phase, which many thought would be a much more arduous task than phase one, was short-lived and there was a scarcity of targets. Nevertheless, it added to the variety, as this was almost entirely an army support operation. Once again extreme accuracy was essential and pilots had to close their targets against some better organized anti-aircraft fire.

At first light on Monday the 5th, the Carriers, now within a very short distance of the coast, sent Venoms to the paratroop dropping area to deal with any possible opposition. The attacks were called off 10 minutes before the main drop, but such was the efficiency and accuracy of the air support, this could have continued until a fraction of time before the drop. After the drop, aircraft circled overhead ready to be called down by Army liaison officers to help the paratroopers, but there were more aircraft in the air than

were needed, as the troops made light of the opposition in front of them. At sea, combat air patrols were still being flown by aircraft from the British Carriers as well as the French. While this was necessary, it became almost embarrassing to order a squadron for this duty.

Meanwhile, Gamil airfield had been captured and casualties, happily few, had been brought off by the Fleet Carriers' own helicopters.

Towards evening there was a hold-up as it appeared that the Military Governor of Port Said was ready to capitulate. However, after a good deal of talking, this was called off and set the pattern for full scale operations the next day, Tuesday, 6 November.

At first light on the 6th, the Light Fleet Carriers *Ocean* and *Theseus* closed Port Said. For weeks this squadron had been worked up to operational efficiency by RAdm G. B. Sayer. Their task was twofold. To land a full-scale Royal Marine Commando in support of the Commandos



already ashore, and to provide transport for wounded from the field of battle to the sick bay. They did both extremely well, making helicopter history by landing 450 Royal Marines, 106 anti-tank weapons and equipment amounting to 15 tons, and by having one Marine casualty back in the sick bay only 20 minutes from the time he was flown off from the Carrier by helicopter.

Following the Royal Marine Commando the Army Main Force began their landing and every effort was made to give full air support. Evidence of the success of the work was recorded for all time in a signal from the Army Commander ashore which read: "To all supporting aircraft. Many thanks for your magnificent support to us this day which thrilled all ranks. Its timely effectiveness and accuracy were beyond praise and doubtless saved many casualties."

To obtain this accuracy, once again very close support had been

given and there were casualties in the air. One Seahawk was shot down by flak on El Quantara and the pilot, after a successful ejection, landed on the east side of the Canal. Immediately, he was covered by fighter aircraft which kept watch over him, even to the extent of discouraging a couple of vehicles from getting near to him. Meanwhile, *Eagle's* helicopter, also covered by fighter aircraft, quickly reached the scene and returned him to his ship. A Wyvern which was badly hurt was nursed back to the Fleet by the pilot, but he had to eject near the Carrier. He was only 60 seconds in the sea before a helicopter had him safely on board.

On this day the French combat air patrol covering the Carriers and now close to the shore, had some relief from boredom. Three E-boats were sighted coming out of Alexandria harbour and during the subsequent attack one was sunk by a direct hit.

It was now that the international situation as a whole took matters out of the hands of the Allied Forces in the Canal Zone. During the night of Tuesday, the 6th, a "Cease-fire" was ordered and all operations were immediately suspended. This was a tremendous disappointment to all who took part in the operations, as they were so very nearly at the goal which had been set.

All the same, for the Carriers there was much to compensate for this unexpected check when in full view of the objective. Suez, with all its conflicting issues in the international field, its criticism on the military side and its trail of misunderstanding in this country, had lit a torch in Naval affairs which may not die out for many a year. The aircraft carrier had been brought into its own and its place as the spearhead of the Fleet proved in practice far beyond any doubt. There is every reason to suppose that when the recent changes in the Armed Forces were thrashed out, these were made more clear to the authorities because of the example of Suez. The Carrier force with its mobility, great striking power and highly trained personnel, represents the key to the Navies of the future, and Suez removed all criticism from this development, which had taken all the post-war years to evolve. US MC



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
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
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By BGen L. C. Hudson

adding REALITY to landing exercises

Are we employing our Aggressor forces in the most effective way?

☛ THERE ARE MANY WHO CONCEIVE of an amphibious landing exercise as a maneuver which should present a picture of precision. Their concept is somewhat as follows: Prior to dawn, ships steam to allotted positions off shore. At first light a short violent preparation is launched. Air and naval gunfire de-

stroy or neutralize important enemy strongpoints. At sunrise helicopter-borne troops close on objectives inland from the beach while troops riding in amphibian tractors approach the beach from the sea. The landing is accomplished within seconds of H-hour. A formidable obstacle is breached and then the

friendly or "Blue" troops clear the beach rapidly. As succeeding waves land, there is only a momentary pause as they get their bearings then press on inland. As Blue troops advance they drive back the simulated enemy or "Aggressor." Air strikes are called for and delivered within a few minutes. Naval gunfire keeps

up its ready support. The shore party establishes itself ashore, prepares the beach, lays matting and sets in motion the materials handling equipment. Then vehicles with men and supplies roll across the beach. Succeeding higher command echelons land and establish their headquarters ashore. Communications are established between the various echelons. The maneuver ashore continues for a few days until the aggressor is dealt with. Then all is secured. Troops re-embark and another annual training exercise is completed.

Such an exercise can occur; but what are some of the prior "conditions" that must be met? Before the exercise, each major movement of Blue forces and the Aggressor must be planned for. Successive positions to be occupied are calculated. Few events can occur of which the staff does not have prior warning. A close system or control must function almost continuously. For an exercise of this type, Intelligence information would probably be introduced by messages delivered to the assaulting troops by umpire representatives. Seldom would maneuver be too radical or complicated—on the whole there would be an advance on a broad front. Limited night work would be in evidence. Supporting ships and air would have little or no opposition. Air defense measures would be on a minor scale. Supplies actually handled would be adequate for only a portion of the force. Enough wire would be used to back up faulty radio transmissions or procedures. In short, planning and initiative must be suppressed to that which will not spoil the picture of perfection.

In recent amphibious training exercises there is a noticeable variation from this smoothly working concept. Blue forces use and react from Intelligence information developed by their present capabilities; that is, they get only the information their own forces can produce. Aggressor troops do not behave as a "respectable" maneuver enemy should. Aggressor forces use vehicles to move to unexpected places on short notice. Aggressor has used these vehicles in convoy to test Blue alertness and capability of detection. Aggressor has used tanks against

friendly forces at inconvenient times. He has cut supply routes, seized separated supply points, sprung ambushes in rear areas, even forced certain surface air installations to become proficient in ground anti-mechanized procedures.

Aggressor has used his air to seriously inconvenience Blue air. He has been "ornery" enough to take advantage of poor visibility and find and use blind spots in our air defense. He has repeated unorthodox tactics. He has caused Blue force staff officers no end of unscheduled night work on unpredicted problems. And yet Blue forces have profited extensively by such actions and thanked the Aggressors for their contribution to reality. What are some of the major requisites necessary to bring about such a situation?

It seems obvious that ground and air component commanders must be of such caliber that they are willing to see their subordinates experiment, make mistakes, even publicize them with visiting seniors present, in order that all may learn. In this the Marine Corps is fortunate, we have those who are willing to experiment. Then we must have personnel, materiel, organization and a prepared plan to insure that aggressor functioning will produce the results we need. It is on the latter points that we can expand with some experience.

With regard to availability of personnel to form effective Aggressor forces we usually find only limited help from outside sources. Each commander is usually faced with the decision either of allocating substantial parts of his own understrength forces, or of being content with a very small Aggressor force. Many times higher headquarters can help in some categories; but more frequently, they find themselves so committed that their contribution will be of a minimum amount. Thus the problem which the commander weighs is, "Do I strip myself of needed forces in order to build up an Aggressor or do I minimize the Aggressor forces and thus provide for exercising my entire command?" Is it preferable for a higher air or ground commander to exercise control over all his forces or do his "stripped-down" forces benefit most when active opposition is created?

From an Aggressor commander's viewpoint, the answer is clear; give the Aggressor force the means he needs to make an exercise which will test friendly troops, staffs and commanders. Many Blue force commanders concur with this viewpoint. Experience indicates that valuable practical results can be obtained with an Aggressor force equal to approximately one-third the size of the Blue force. In emergencies, Blue forces have benefitted when opposed by Aggressor forces much smaller than this.

In addition to provision of needed personnel, the bringing into existence of required Aggressor force materiel will probably prove painful. Aggressor fixed and rotary-winged planes for air support, trucks, tanks, amphibian vehicles and communication facilities can make the exercise-play of major interest to troops and their commanders. In conducting the exercise one soon learns that with control and transportation even a small Aggressor force can be made to appear many times its true size. Thus adequate communication and transportation equipment will head a list of materiel requirements. First, take up the matter of communications. Immediately one comes to the objection that there are not enough radios to provide control under conditions of unit separation. Here again ingenuity and foresight will pay dividends. Frequently Aggressor forces have several weeks in which to prepare. This time may be employed to lay (or repair) an extensive net of wire over the maneuver area. Thus, lacking sufficient radio equipment, wire can become an effective substitute. Effectiveness of such wire is increased by issuing orders that no forces will cut or tap such wires. Artificial restrictions of this nature, favoring the Aggressor forces, usually will be required. Next, consider the matter of transportation. In the United States, truck transportation is rarely a serious problem if this is considered early in planning. A few tanks and amphibian tractors serve to enliven interest of Blue forces. All such items are multiplied in effective usage by the provision that after a certain period of time following capture or disablement these vehicles will revert to control of Aggressor



Adequate transportation is essential for effective Aggressor forces

forces—another artificiality—but necessary when operating on an austere basis. Indeed a common complaint of Blue forces at critiques has been the number of times they have been required to knock out the same Aggressor materiel. With explanations of the necessity for such “resurrections” there is usually a ready acceptance of such unorthodox procedure.

Although LFM-1, “training,” contains a paragraph on training amphibious troop umpire-control personnel and a section on “Aggressor forces,” the portion which treats of organization is rather general—as indeed is necessary in this type publication. The manual “Troop Umpire Control, Amphibious Operations, 1951,” treats the subject more extensively. What follows are supplementary comments based on observations of recent exercises.

Within the Umpire-Director’s headquarters there is a rather conventional organization. There will

be a headquarters commandant section and G-1/G-4, G-2, G-3, fire support coordinator, communications and certain countermeasures sections. Their duties are of a normal pattern and need no further elaboration.

There is need for liaison officers or teams with the principal air and ground commanders. There will be liaison with the amphibious troop headquarters. These liaison groups may be small, on the order of 2 officers, plus necessary communication personnel. An umpire group is needed to work with each infantry regiment. Four or five officers are required to remain with the regiments in the field. These officers lead a busy few days, relaying information to and from the regiments to umpire headquarters and introducing innumerable situations as required. They cover operations, intelligence and logistics functioning. A smaller group is required with the artillery regiment. Similar groups will ac-

company each battalion landing team. It would be of benefit to have additional groups with each company but experience shows available personnel are usually lacking. Logistical umpire teams will concentrate on functioning or supply, maintenance, evacuation, transportation and service functions at the beach and dumps inland. Other umpire groups work with the air headquarters, and mobile teams are dispatched to air operations sites. Umpire teams work with the Tactical Air Control Center/Tactical Air Direction Center, Direct Air Support Center, and the Marine Air Groups. All are tied in by communications to the Troop Umpire-Control Director whose headquarters keeps functioning continuously.

Necessary instruction for the umpire and Aggressor organization will require a minimum of one week instruction time. The schooling may be broken down into parts consisting of a general session for all personnel and then a further period in which personnel are allocated to instruction given on the more technical subjects. For umpires, the instruction on umpire duties, in general, may be followed by broad groupings as: tactical umpiring, air umpiring and logistical umpiring. The following list of subjects indicates the nature of those that may be covered in the instruction under general umpiring:

- Amphibious troop plan
- Ground umpire organization, operation, concept
- Air umpire organization, operation, concept
- Aggressor organization, mission, plan
- Umpire-control communications
- Control concept
- General instructions on tactical umpiring
- Administrative umpiring
- Intelligence umpiring
- Special weapons umpiring
- Reports

Concurrently with planning, organization and instruction, a detailed concept of Aggressor and umpire employment must be drawn up with close attention being paid to the provision of a realistic test of the exercise objectives. In this concept the imagination of all staff offi-



BGen Hudson earned the Navy Cross while commanding a battalion on Iwo Jima. He has served as: US Military Observer to the UN Palestine Mission, Jerusalem—while serving in this capacity he was appointed President of the Mixed Armistice Commission of the UN; Asst to the Representative of the JCS as a member of the Senior Staff, National Security Council; Director of the Marine Corps Development Center. He is presently the CG, LFTU, Amphibious Training Command, Atlantic Fleet, Little Creek, Va.

cers can be helpful. In order to maintain the interest of troops and their commanders taking part in an exercise involving divisions and wings, the umpires and Aggressors will find invariably that available means will challenge their initiative to the utmost. A rather easy system of control functioning could consist of drawing lines on a map and agreeing that this represents the limit of advance for each day; then base subsidiary plans on these determinations. This is easy but harmful. It is harmful in that it soon kills the initiative of Blue troops who are intelligent enough to realize the situation almost as soon as this system is put into effect. When the Blue leaders perceive this artificial restraint their frustration is communicated to their troops. A more difficult, but necessary, system of control consists of realistic reaction to Blue advances, patterning the Aggressor action upon Blue action. Preplanning for action patterned upon Blue's moves is of a very limited span since the details of the Blue advance will not be known. However, an alert Aggressor backed up by a troop umpire-control organization with good liaison, intelligence and communications, can counter Blue moves with adequate realism to satisfy the most ardent Blue commanders.

As if the foregoing action and counteraction were not trying enough in themselves, there is added a further complication. The umpire and Aggressor organizations cannot pattern their movements solely upon that of the friendly forces. A major requirement for Aggressor functioning is to set up situations that will test the objectives of the exercise.

By way of illustration let us consider that along with tactical proficiency, it is desired to test particularly combat surveillance and the capability of small units to operate efficiently when separated by several thousands of yards. Then some events planned may be of the following type. While Blue forces are enroute to the objective area, several appropriately marked Aggressor truck convoys make runs along routes which Aggressor forces would be expected to use—with the objective to determine the Blue forces'



Extensive use of wire can be a satisfactory substitute for radio

capability of detecting and intercepting these movements. As Blue advance forces near the area, set up ambushes to attempt apprehension of probable Blue ground reconnaissance forces. Launch sneak Aggressor air attacks against Blue forces. As Blue forces land and proceed inland, Aggressor tests their training by a variety of means: augment a mobile defense by concealing troops which permit bypassing, then later launch their attacks; use dummies and "planted" enemy documents to give various types of information, some true, some false; launch night attacks from land, sea and air. Aggressor forces can work in relays at night attacks; using transportation they can attack one flank and then another. Infiltrating groups can seek rear areas and exploit weakness. Patrols can harass the main supply route. Air can sneak in deep rear area patrols. Aggressor truck convoys can make daily runs which should be picked up and reported by Blue surveillance. Air strikes knock out dumps. An Aggressor special weapons drop capability requires Blue forces to seek detection more diligently than ever before. And wherever possible these activities are shaped toward testing the exercise objectives.

Senior officers can add to the smoothness of the conduct of the exercise. A cooperating maneuver or umpire-control director can actively forestall criticisms of arbitrary de-

cisions, unfairness, etc., by the employment of nothing more drastic than friendly visits to various senior headquarters (or, in another arrangement, having them visit him daily). During these visits there will be opportunity to relate just what did happen from the umpire-control viewpoint that day and to discover just what was reported down the Blue chain of command. And it goes without saying that he will learn many details which did not come to his attention during that day. When made with a helpful attitude there is an unexpected amount of mutual benefit to be gained from such closeness of coordination.

One does not need much imagination to picture the added benefits to troops in an opposed exercise. When Aggressor forces are employed effectively they give the Blue forces a taste of the "fog of war," test their reactions to unpredicted situations, show up strength or weakness in command or staff functioning, air and ground, and finally, give the troops and officers a sense of accomplishment when the Aggressor forces are finally dealt with. Extra hours of effort on the part of the umpire-control and Aggressor organizations are repaid by comments of senior air and ground officers concerning added effectiveness to peacetime training. Marine Corps organizations profit from their carefully planned and executed opposition.

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An Analysis of the . . .



International Security

The Military Aspect

AMERICA AT MID-CENTURY
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Rockefeller-Kissinger REPORT

"THE ROLES AND MISSIONS OF THE MILITARY SERVICES"

By Davis Merwin

THE "TRADITIONAL" MISSIONS OF the military services are obsolete, competitive rather than complementary, and out of accord with both weapons technology and the principal military threats to our national safety.

So says the blue ribbon Rockefeller report on defense organization released recently with a Madison Avenue sunburst of publicity.

True to the Madison Avenue belief that the public does not think and that it reads only at the level of newspaper headlines, the report does not confuse the reader by disclosing the basis for its conclusions.

Instead it merely identifies "critical areas of weakness" and advances "several broad principles which should guide the present organization and changes."

A somewhat meandering, the report volunteers that general principles produced by the panel could not be taken alive, but did not deter it from advocating in principle what it could not defend in detail.

The report then is unencumbered by detailed evidence to support its allegations of weakness, or to show that its proposed broad changes would result in greater effectiveness.

This exceptional freedom from detail was possible because the thesis of the Rockefeller report had been limned in, several months prior to the meetings of the panel of distinguished citizens, by its articulate project director, Harvard professor Dr. Henry Kissinger. His reflections and his pen, shaped the report of an earlier panel, meeting under the auspices of the Council on Foreign Relations. The Rockefeller panel

did little more than embrace the Kissinger conclusions and give them greater currency.

Thus, it is to Kissinger's book *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* that one must turn to find the rationale to support the conclusions and recommendations of the Rockefeller Report. By contrast with his masterful treatment of the political aspects of the East-West problem, Kissinger's treatment of the purely military aspects of the problem is superficial and unconvincing.

It is not uncommon for an enthusiastic protagonist of a theory to develop it on the basis of unsound and unexamined premises. This formula characterizes Dr. Kissinger's philosophy of military organization. However, Kissinger's philosophy is so self-evident and itself to the point that one must conclude that he had not made up his own mind when he started to write, or that his book is only a patchwork of dissonant ideas, presented in a matrix of eloquent grammar.

For the present purposes, however, we are not concerned with Kissinger per se but Kissinger as a key to the Rockefeller report. This article treats one of the areas covered by that report, the roles and missions of the military services, leaving until another time the subject of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the office of the Secretary of Defense.

The Kissinger Jargon

To understand Kissinger, who is a philosopher rather than a military man, one must first understand his unconventional use of certain military terms.

First, "strategic" and "tactical." What is the general meaning of these terms?

In the past, strategy and tactics have related not to weapons, but to objectives in warfare—strategy referring broadly to the grand design, or to major campaigns; tactics to methods of winning particular battles or maneuvers. The same weapons have been employed in strategy as in tactics. By derivation, a weapon that can be used to further strategy in war has now become a "strategic weapon"—which means in effect a weapon which is used against an enemy's war-making potential—whether its industrial or economic organization or its will to fight on.

Until the coming of the atomic bomb, there were no devices described as "strategic weapons" only the use of weapons strategically (for example, the use of warships to enforce economic blockade). Nevertheless, it is still the use of the weapon rather than its nature which determines its classification as "strategic" or "tactical." A "tactical" H-bomb dropped on a fleet or other military concentration would have been a "strategic" H-bomb if delivered on an enemy industrial complex.

No hard and fast line can be drawn between strategy and tactics. Strategic forces or weapons can be used tactically; conversely, tactical forces or weapons can be used strategically. While clearly antipodal examples of strategic and tactical use of weapons can be given, there is a wide area in between where the classification is patently unstable and indistinct.

The fact is, that a nation that attempted to compartment its forces

... a clear distinction must be made between the roles and missions assigned by law, and the more detailed functions assigned by executive order of the Secretary of Defense

according to whether they would be used strategically or tactically would be putting itself in a strait-jacket. No nation — no individual — has ever proposed it — at least until Dr. Kissinger came along. The label attached to our Strategic Air Command is indicative of its primary role but this does not preclude its use tactically if the need arises.

Once the national decision is made to use force, there should be no arbitrary compartmentation within the military organization which would prohibit the use of any available military power. Obviously, the degree of force to be used is governed by political as well as military considerations. But if the fighter is to have one hand tied, the decision should be made with reference to a particular set of circumstances—not on the basis of a hard and fast rule.

What may be "strategy" on one occasion may be "tactics" on another — the political objectives will in many cases provide the criteria for such classification. In any event, our military forces must be prepared to fight "the war" to whatever extent politically necessary. In each instance there will be the formulation of a strategic plan and application of tactical and strategic means in its execution.

In the light of this background, what is the precise content of the terms "strategic" and "tactical" as used by Kissinger? He appears to have derived his usage from the Air Force division of its forces into the Strategic Air Command and the Tactical Air Command. "Strategic" is equated with strategic bombardment. "Tactical" then, by elimination, is synonymous with all military operations except strategic bombardments. A note is needed on continental air defense. By Kissinger this function is regarded as strategic. According to Rockefeller-Kissinger it is neither strategic nor tactical but a separate function.

Next, "total war" and "limited war." Since under our current stra-

tegic concept the principal strategy, at least initially, in a decisive conflict between the Soviet Union and the US is strategic bombing. Kissinger equates the terms "strategic" and "total war." By elimination "tactical" is associated with all aspects of warfare except strategic bombardment—an entity identified as "limited war." More later about this identification of 2 distinct entities "total war" and "limited war."

Thus, by oversimplification of the terms "strategic" and "tactical" and by identifying these oversimplified terms with oversimplified versions of what he identifies as 2 distinct entities, "total war" and "limited war", Kissinger has prepared a basis for his eventual conclusion that the military forces should be placed in 2 compartments, one labeled "Strategic Force—for total war only", the other "Tactical Force—for all but total warfare." The former is virtually synonymous with the Strategic Air and Continental Air Defense Commands; the latter comprises all other air, land and sea forces.

Kissinger recognizes the versatility of the Communist threat. Yet his proposal to reorganize the armed forces into 2 distinct compartments, each self sufficient and earmarked for a specific kind of war, would lead to rigidity rather than versatility in responding to those threats. This rigidity, which would characterize the 2 self-sufficient, mutually-exclusive forces, must result in a much higher cost-price, through enormous duplication of manpower, installations, equipment, maintenance and so on. Yet this higher cost would not be reflected in greater national security. The increase would be needed just to try to keep abreast of present capabilities—a goal which could never be achieved. The best laid plans are worthless, in the absence of national solvency.

Roles and Missions—General

To establish a basis for the charge that the missions of the military serv-

ices are obsolete, competitive rather than complementary, and out of accord with both weapons technology and the principal military threats to our national safety, Rockefeller-Kissinger inaccurately postulate that the present missions of the Army, Navy and Air Force are based upon their respective modes of transportation. That is, if it walks it's in the Army—if it flies it's in the Air Force and if it floats it's in the Navy.

These are the elemental, earth-air-water bins of the original Collins plan, which was carefully studied in the unification hearings of 1946-'47. But the Congress, in the National Security Act of 1947, specifically rejected this elementary tri-dimensional thesis and legislated instead the organization of the military forces on a purposive basis. Examples are the provision of aviation for both the Army and Navy, and the air/ground organization of the Marine Corps.

Before examining the differences between these 2 theories of organization, let's take a look at the roles and missions and their purpose and meaning. Rockefeller-Kissinger do not seem to be very clear on these points.

At the outset a clear distinction must be made between the *roles* and *missions* assigned by law, and the more detailed *functions* assigned by executive order of the Secretary of Defense. The provisions of the law on roles and missions are not narrow or confining, but broad.

With respect to the Army, the law states:

"It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land."

With respect to the Navy, the law states:

"The Navy shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea."

Referring to the Air Force, the law says:

... contrary to the Rockefeller-Kissinger premise, the fighting forces do not find their combatant missions tied to any means of locomotion whatever

"It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations."

It is significant that these provisions use the words "shall be organized, trained and equipped." What this means is that the law does not specify how forces provided by the several services will be employed in combat. Instead, in a Declaration of Policy, Congress specified the effective strategic direction of the armed forces and their operation *under unified control*. In other words, and contrary to the Rockefeller-Kissinger premise, the fighting forces do not find their combatant missions tied to any means of locomotion whatever.

In the more detailed statement of functions pertaining to each of the armed services, the Secretary of Defense, in the *Functions Paper* (a DOD directive which amplifies the law), has likewise used the terminology "organized, trained and equipped," and has stated that the functions shall be carried out in such a manner as to achieve "operation of armed forces under unified command, wherever such unified command is in the best interest of national security."

Thus, the assignment of roles and missions by law and the more detailed administrative assignment of functions is not to set arbitrary restrictions on how forces will be employed in combat, a matter which is at the discretion of the unified commanders of the several strategic areas, but rather to decentralize and assign responsibility for training, organization, administration and development of forces for combat. Further, the *Functions Paper* recognizes that technological developments and other changes may dictate altering the assignment of functions—a duty of the Secretary of Defense. Here there is complete flexibility for making necessary adjustments—there is no bar in law or regulation prohibiting changes in func-

tions by those in a position of responsibility.

Kissinger's erroneous premise that the military forces are organized on the basis of their means of locomotion discloses a failure to grasp fully, America's significant advance beyond the organizational philosophy of the landbound armies of continental Europe. Theirs was the tri-elemental theory which held that the Army, Navy and Air Force should provide forces organized, equipped and trained for the exercise of special skills demonstrated on the ground, on or under the water, and in the air respectively.

This is a theory based on individual weapons—air weapons, ground weapons, water weapons—and if carried to its logical extreme, results in absurdities. For example, air and ship bases would have to be manned by Army personnel; only in the air and at sea could Air Force and Navy personnel take charge. Even the proponents of this elemental approach would not wish to carry their analysis to this ridiculous extreme; they maintain only that the primary criterion for organization should be the element in which the weapons of a given service are used.

Even as a primary criterion, however, the tri-elemental theory can lead to strange thinking. Take for example, rockets which use the air as a medium of travel—are they air

weapons? Or anti-aircraft guns, which shoot down enemy aircraft, are they an air weapon?

The rationale behind the weapons tri-elemental theory is this: warfare itself is purposive at the topmost level—to impose our will on the enemy. Therefore, it is presumed that the next lower level should logically be a process level and the air, sea and land divisions seem made to order.

The reasoning continues by presuming that an Army confined to the use of land-bound weapons, a Navy restricted to sea-bound weapons, and Air Force of air-bound weapons would each furnish contingents of elemental specialists for constitution into combat task forces on the level next below that at which this division into pure elemental forces exists. That is to say, balanced combat task forces would be created next below the level of the Military Departments.

This sort of thinking is sound enough as far as it goes, and is a fair theoretical explanation of how and why joint task forces and unified area commands are organized.

But this theory of organization, which seemed so logical to the theoreticians of the land-bound armies of central Europe prior to the development of the full potential of their air arms, is less than adequate in the air age. It is particularly inadequate

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**... only a relatively small percentage of the total action
in war is joint action to any significant degree**

for the US surrounded, as it is, by oceans. The air and naval aspects of our defense problem could scarcely have been imagined by those who thought of air and naval forces only as auxiliaries to the principal effort—the defeat by land forces of the enemy's armies.

It was our national experience in WWII, confirmed by more than 3 years of continuous combat in Korea, that there are 3 distinct fields of warfare and that their inter-relationship, while sometimes substantial in a broad sense, is seldom intimate. Indeed, only a relatively small percentage of the total action in war is joint action to any significant degree.

It was this experience, unique perhaps to the US, which made it possible for the Congress to see that the war-making purpose of this most powerful nation is too enormously comprehensive to permit a breakdown at the Departmental level into process type organizations. A breakdown by purposive types was clearly dictated by the scope of the total activity as well as by the fact that this activity naturally fell into 3 broad and largely independent fields.

As was noted in the 1950 *Report of the Investigation by the House Armed Services Committee on Unification and Strategy*, the military service developed in response to the needs of each of these 3 largely independent fields of warfare: "is the repository of a vast amount of skill, or tremendous specialization, in integrated, specialized fields of human effort and endeavor quite as distinct and complicated and as different as, in civil life, the doctor and the lawyer, the minister and the engineer."

The major purpose of each service is to develop forces capable of commanding the element in or on which it primarily operates. But to achieve command of its element, a given service may require instruments or individuals developed and trained for operations in another element—for example, command of the sea

requires airplanes, as does command of the land, and command of the air requires airfields.

Command of the sea is well understood; it has always been the mission of the Navy. Command of the air, as expressed by the term "air superiority" or "air supremacy," means that friendly aircraft are in large part free to use the air at will and that the enemy is in large part denied such use.

Command of the land is an expression not found in military manuals, because command of the sea and command of the air have always been thought of as auxiliary conditions necessary for pushing home the ultimate effort: defeat of the enemy's armies. But command of the sea and air, brought about the defeat of Japan without any land invasion. In modern war, in some instances, land forces may have no greater role than aiding in the defense of air bases—that is, exercising command of the land so that the weapons of air power can be turned on the enemy.

Command of the land, as an expression paralleling the more common expressions, command of the sea and command of the air, does not lose its usefulness in describing major and sustained land operations. It means the ability to carry out ground combat plans against the ground enemy; it could vary in degree, just as do command of the sea and command of the air.

What this means is that the roles of the Army, Navy and Air Force are to provide not walkers, sailors and airmen or tanks, ships and aircraft, but purposive type forces whose respective war missions are to gain and exploit command of the land, sea and air against the enemy. The concrete expressions of service roles and missions are the field army, the balanced fleet and the tactical and strategic air forces.

To be sure, this purposive theory of organization can be carried so far as to claim the right of complete self-sufficiency for each service, a

claim that would be patently absurd. The proper solution is a compromise between the elemental approach and the purposive approach, but with wisdom it is weighted toward the latter.

A primarily purposive approach to the organization of military forces is characterized by little or no duplication of functions, but results in some duplication of means. This planned duplication of means must be carefully controlled so that the increased effectiveness gained through such duplication of instruments among the services does not lead eventually to an over-all increase in forces, placing an unnecessary strain on national resources.

However, because Army forces engage in land operations it is not duplication for the Navy to maintain Fleet Marine Forces adequate to the specific task of seizing and holding naval bases or of projecting naval power onto a hostile shore. And because the Air Force engages in air operations it is not duplication for the Navy to maintain aircraft, which are a major element in naval operations, or for the Army to maintain the aircraft and the anti-aircraft means which are so important in the exercise of modern land power.

The alternative to permitting and even encouraging some duplication of instruments in the interest of effective land power, naval power, and air power would be to rely on the weapons tri-elemental approach to a degree that would reduce the power, flexibility and overall combat effectiveness of our field armies, our balanced fleets and our air forces in their respective roles.

Indeed, it would destroy these concepts for it would require the establishment of task forces at the national level for the accomplishment of any mission or purpose, since the Army, Navy and Air Force could not provide forces capable of any significant combat action without the attachment of elemental specialists from other services.

... our military services are organized on a purposive or broad functional basis

But this is not in prospect—unless Congress should abdicate an important part of its responsibility in respect to the military with which it is charged under the Constitution—for, under the organization prescribed by Congress, the role of each of the services is to provide forces organized primarily upon the basis of purpose, that purpose being command of the element in which it primarily operates. This leads to the field army, the balanced fleet and the numbered air force as the organizational expressions of service missions.

Obviously, none of these forces is completely self-sufficient even for its primary purpose and, obviously, each of the 3 broad purposes is inter-related and dependent to a greater or lesser extent upon the others. Consequently, there has been established in each strategic area a unified commander whose duty it is to gain and exploit most effectively the command of the land, sea and air in that strategic area, by directing the operations of the forces of the 3 services and by combining them as appropriate in joint task forces.

In some cases, as in Korea, the field army plays the dominant role. In other cases it may be an air force or a fleet. Finally there are operations—airborne and amphibious operations are the most common—where service elements organized, equipped and trained to fight in different media—land, sea and air are brought together in the face of the enemy in closely co-ordinated action designed to achieve a common goal. These joint task force operations are, by their nature, of limited duration and, upon their completion, the service components of the joint task force resume their normal relationship with other service elements within the strategic area.

The significant thing is that even with the global sweep of US respon-

sibilities, few of our combat operations are joint in this intimate sense. Take Korea, for example. Only for amphibious and airborne operations were joint task forces established. For the rest—the great bulk of the action—the 8th Army conducted the land war, while the 5th Air Force finally took control of the air war, and supported the 8th Army by providing interdiction and direct support of the troops, and the Fleet conducted the sea war, at the same time supporting the 8th Army logistically and with aviation and naval gunfire. All were under the direction of the unified theater commander who, balancing the requirements of the ground war against those of the air war and the sea war, could direct any shift in emphasis he thought desirable.

Kissinger's premise then is wrong. Our military services are not organized on the basis of their means of locomotion. Instead, they are organized on a purposive or broad functional basis—to provide forces to command the land, to command the sea and to command the air. And finally—a point which Kissinger completely ignores—these forces are assigned to unified commands where all are under the command of one officer with a joint staff.

Roles and Missions Out of Accord with Principal Military Threats to National Security

Passing off strategic air and continental air defense as representing one integrated strategic mission, Kissinger postulates just one additional integrated strategic mission, "limited war." But Rockefeller-Kissinger do not look at "limited war" from the standpoint of the European Command, the Atlantic Command or the Pacific Command—unified commands established within certain strategic areas for the precise purpose of conducting "limited war;" that is, if we

include in "limited war" all warfare except strategic bombardment.

Instead, Rockefeller-Kissinger & Co. appear to survey the globe from the continental US and in so doing overlook the existing unified commands. They see various potential trouble spots but not the balanced forces already in those strategic areas: tactical air, fleet units, the 5 divisions in Western Europe and 5 in the Pacific.

They overlook the fact that each hypothetical trouble spot is even now the responsibility of a Unified Commander, who already has substantial forces at his disposal to meet any threat within his strategic area.

The net result is that Kissinger appears to visualize limited war primarily in terms of ground action by US troops overseas. That is, he devises an "integrated strategic mission" in which the ultimate effort is ground action for which command of the air and sea are auxiliary conditions. By this means, air power and sea power are cast in the light of supporting forces and land power assigned a role out of proportion to its actual significance in meeting the military threats to our security.

Kissinger's integrated strategic mission would subordinate our fleets and our tactical air forces in precisely the same manner that the German Army harnessed air and sea forces to a ground strategy. It was this type of thinking which resulted in Germany's failure to develop a maritime strategy that might have cut Europe off from the support provided by the US, or the air strategy that might have brought Great Britain to its knees. Wehrmacht "war force," in Germany, meant land force, tightly supported by sea and air, and it spelled Germany's defeat.

But this philosophy meets our strategic needs even less. It does not even recognize the largely independ-

... operations of the fleets are conducted by unified commanders in the two great ocean theaters in accordance with the strategic direction of the JCS as transmitted through the Department of the Navy

ent sea and air wars which must be conducted even before troops can be transported to the combat zone. In fact, it links the transportation of the troops not with the sea or air war in the areas through which the transports, with their helpless passengers, must pass but with the combatant functions of land forces after their delivery to the zone of ground combat. Realistically such movements are an exercise in sea power or air power, requiring the use of combatant instruments in no way related to land power.

It is the scope and importance of sea and air tasks and their inter-relationship with land force that the tri-elementalist often overlooks. For example, take the globally deployed units of the US fleets. Upon them has fallen the heavy task performed so many years by the British Navy. Our fleets are the guarantor of the freedom of the seas and it is this freedom which gives coherence to the defensive efforts of the whole free world.

If our command of the seas were to be challenged by the Soviets—a not unreasonable hypothesis in view of the critical importance of sea transport in our commerce and defensive efforts—we must use the massive deterrent, fight a protracted war at sea or watch helplessly while the free world alliances dissolve and their members are drawn into the Communist orbit by economic and military blackmail. And all this without a single movement on the part of land forces.

Operations of the fleets are conducted by unified commanders in the 2 great ocean theaters in accordance with the strategic direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as transmitted through the Department of the Navy. What possible gain in effectiveness could result from submerging the direction of these operations in a new hybrid headquarters made up of an equal number of officers from all 3 services? Similarly, the operations of the European Com-

mand, a command in which land force interests predominate, would be less effective if the present executive agency responsibility were taken from the Department of the Army and vested in a new tri-service headquarters.

Turn now more directly to the Rockefeller-Kissinger charge that the current roles and missions are out of accord with the principal military threats to our security. This charge is based, in the first instance, upon the erroneous assumption that the roles of the services are the product of their means of locomotion. As we have seen, their missions are rather to produce service components organized, equipped and trained to command the air, command the land, and command the sea.

The charge is based, in the second instance, upon Kissinger's wholly unsuccessful effort to divide warfare into 2 distinct and unrelated entities styled "total war" and "limited war." On the basis of these 2 entities, Kissinger jumps to the conclusion that we need not have 3 services but rather 2 distinct and separate forces—one for each of the 2 so-called "integrated missions." Thus, one compartment labeled "Strategic Force—for total war only" and another labeled variously "limited war force," "peripheral war force" or "all but total war force."

The idea that compartmentation of the military forces on this basis would respond more effectively to the principal military threats to our national security than compartmentation on the basis of the 3 services, does not stand up under analysis.

Roles and Missions, Compartmentation and Development of Military Doctrine

Regardless of the ultimate use of forces, certain areas of responsibility for the development of military doctrines and techniques and for the provision of trained components must be assigned. Currently these areas of responsibility are expressed

in the broad statutory "roles and missions" and the more specific administrative delineation of "functions" discussed above.

The assignment of roles and missions, the nature of administrative compartmentation within the structure of the armed forces, and the effective development of doctrines and techniques for the conduct of modern warfare are all interrelated. Since the end result is effectiveness in battle, the development of effective doctrines and techniques is the end to which broad missions and administrative compartmentation must be responsive.

Development of Military Doctrine

Although the principles of war constitute broad guidelines for conduct of military operations, techniques and procedures of a more transitory nature and more specific application are continuously evolved in the military profession. These doctrines, which guide the conduct of specific types of operations or broad tasks, are subject to constant revision to reflect the impact of new weapons, new concepts, or other changing conditions.

Thus, military doctrines generally are transitory products of a continuous evolution, and their validity at any time depends upon their currency. France's Maginot Line fixation prior to WWII is an example of a failure of the evolutionary process and of a tendency for doctrines to become rigid and unresponsive to changing factors and conditions. This is a constant danger and the validity of military doctrine depends to a great extent on close association in combat or in training exercises of individuals and weapon systems relating to closely associated processes.

If the term doctrine seems remote and esoteric just remember that it is doctrine that specifies the number and types of units to be maintained and their composition, the training to be given, the equipment to be developed and procured and the types

... Much of the discussion regarding the organizational structure of the armed forces stems from failure to understand the doctrinal problem

and amounts of supplies to be distributed.

Literally everything a military service does stems from its doctrine. Recall, too, that the development of doctrine for combat is the major activity of a military service in peacetime. The service schools, its developmental centers, its field forces and its service headquarters all devote the major part of their time to the improvement of the Service's doctrine.

Nature of Compartmentation Within Armed Forces Structure

The administrative compartmentation which will be most effective in developing military doctrine must reflect the functional grouping of weapons and personnel. These groupings should embrace those processes which are closely associated in the conduct of operations of various broad types. Any type of administrative compartmentation which significantly separates these functional groupings must inevitably operate to the detriment of the armed forces' overall effectiveness by compromising their ability to develop sound doctrines.

Much of the discussion regarding the organizational structure of the armed forces stems from failure to understand the doctrinal problem. This is reflected in suggestions for administrative reorganization along weapons tri-elemental lines, based on whether the weapons operate in the air, on the water, or on the land; geographic lines, where task forces reflecting area requirements are constituted; process lines, providing groupings in numerous co-equal categories, such as anti-submarine forces and airborne forces.

Under the first method, the weapons tri-elemental compartmentation would emphasize the elimination of any duplication of weapon systems at the expense of the development of doctrines for the coordinated employment of various weapon systems. In the second method the geographic compartmentation dilutes the devel-

opment of sound doctrine through emphasizing doctrinal application in a specific geographical area. In the third method, the various forces involved, of which there would quite obviously be many, would emphasize the accomplishment of specific processes, at the expense of the development of doctrinal concepts relating to closely associated processes.

As was demonstrated above, the combat processes fall naturally into 3 broad groups. Probably as much as 90 per cent of the total combat action is conducted by ground forces, air forces and sea forces each acting in its own element and quite independent of the processes of another service.

For example, an infantry battalion is organized, equipped and trained for ground combat. It employs the doctrine for ground combat developed by the Army which has the mission to prepare such doctrine. By contrast, an aircraft squadron is organized, equipped and trained primarily for air combat. It employs doctrines developed by the Air Force for this purpose. Even if an infantry battalion and an aircraft squadron were placed together in the same administrative compartment, each would spend at least 90 per cent of its training and administrative time preparing for combat processes which are totally unrelated to those of the other unit but which are an integral part of a larger doctrinal fabric for air war or for ground war.

Even in joint operations where elements organized for combat in different media are combined to perform a common task, subordinate units employ the doctrine of the element for combat in which they have been organized, equipped and trained, with only such modifications as are necessary to accommodate to the situation.

The intimate association in actual combat operations of the processes which naturally fall into 3 broad functional groupings have resulted in the current administrative compartmentation of the forces at both

the national level and at the level of the unified commands. Further, compartmentation internally groups personnel and weapons along process lines for efficient detailed training and standardization of related techniques.

Valid arguments may be presented regarding the proper balance between and within the broad compartments, the achievement of maximum economy consistent with optimum effectiveness, standardization of truly common requirements, and general improvement in detailed organization. However, functional compartmentation on the broad bases of air power, sea power, and land power provides the best organizational environment for the development of effective military doctrine, without which our military forces must inevitably become ineffective.

The view of Messrs. Rockefeller and Kissinger that an amorphous generalization "all but total war" constitutes an integrated military mission, upon the basis of which most of our existing military forces should be placed in a single compartment, neglects the doctrinal problems entirely.

So far as the organization of military forces are concerned, the phrases "all but total war" or "limited war" are largely meaningless generalizations. From the standpoint of organization, the military threats to the national security are certain distinct enemy capabilities at sea, in the air and on the ground. These enemy capabilities are best assayed by experts in combat in these media. Similarly, these experts are best qualified to determine the requirements, and develop the means to counter these threats.

It is the genius of the present organizational structure of the armed forces that it recognizes and responds to the military threats to the national security in meaningful military terms and, at the same time, provides the means to coordinate our responses to these threats in terms of an integrated whole—a military

... all differences of opinion relating to air, sea and land war would be decided, not as under the present system (by reference to a politically accountable Secretary of Defense, along with all relevant points of view) but by fiat of the commander of the "all but total war force"

strategy to meet the threat effectively, whatever its form. This results from designing the forces at the national level and at the operational level on the broad bases of air, naval and land power with unified direction provided at the national level by the Secretary of Defense, advised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and direction at the operational level by the unified commander of the strategic area.

Under the present system, military doctrine, techniques and equipment are developed at the departmental level through an infinitely complex interplay between the field forces, the military schools, and various developmental agencies. In this way there is an unbroken service responsibility for doctrinal development, training and logistic and administrative support.

The Rockefeller report would have the military departments retain control of training and doctrinal development as well as procurement and supply. Kissinger, however, goes all the way, assigning both training and doctrine to the commander of his proposed Limited War Force, feeling that it would be unrealistic to expect him to bear the responsibility for the performance of his forces in battle, using ready made forces and doctrine. Eventually, despite the current Rockefeller reservations, training and doctrines must soon come under the control of this new command. In fact, this command could, with some logic, claim control over all factors affecting the performance of its forces including logistics and research and development.

With the establishment of an "all but total war force" it would be necessary, on the basis of the most elementary operational and administrative considerations, to decentralize that force at the national level and at the level of the unified com-

mands in strategic areas into air, ground and sea components. This means going from the air, ground, sea compartments of the existing unified commands to a unified "all but total war force," thence back to the air, ground and sea component within such a force.

What is added by this progression is an additional headquarters—an "all but total war headquarters" with global responsibilities. Its relationships with the unified commanders in the several strategic areas, the Military Departments, the global Strategic Force, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense promise to be a rich source of confusion.

What is lost by the interposition of a commander of the "all but total war force" is now the vital relationship between the present military departments and their components in the strategic commands—a relationship which produces the doctrines, tactics, techniques and equipment to make these components effective each in its distinctive role. All these must eventually become the domain of the new commander who must then become the source of all intelligence, all doctrine, and all requirements for air, land and sea forces.

The new headquarters would absorb not only the intelligence, doctrinal and requirements role of the present military departments but also most of the strategic direction role of the present JCS. Thus all differences of opinion relating to air, sea and land war would be decided, not as under the present system (by reference to a politically accountable Secretary of Defense, along with all relevant points of view) but by fiat of the commander of the "all but total war force." While this type of decision may be desirable at the combat level the headquarters of this limited war force is far from being

a combat headquarters and arbitrary Hitler-like decisions at the national level promise to be right only 20 to 25 per cent of the time.

It is not overstatement to predict that the establishment of a so-called "operational" commander of the scope of the "limited war force" must lead quickly to the crumbling of the Departmental lines along which the Defense Department is now decentralized.

Indeed, the "integrated mission" of the Rockefeller-Kissinger report, which has no real validity as a touchstone for the organization and development of our military forces, could well be identified as the little Collins plan. It would create a single military commander for the lion's share of our land, sea and air forces and reduce the military departments to supply agencies. It would produce not effective forces for the largely unrelated combatant roles, command of the sea, command of the air and command of the land, but an amorphous agglomerate known to the Prussian military theorists as "war power."

The arguments against any such organizational changes are numerous. But the most important is that the resulting organization would respond poorly to the principal military threats to our national security which are measurable enemy capabilities on the sea, on the land and in the air, not a meaningless generality such as "limited war."

The Charge That Missions Are Not In Accord With Technology

The Rockefeller-Kissinger claim that the roles and missions are out of accord with weapons technology is as far off base as their premise that the armed forces are organized on a tri-elemental basis.

In fact, it is only with reference to this elemental theory that the authors could observe with feigned sur-

**... the touchstone is combat effectiveness, not administrative tidiness
or compatibility with a neat symmetrical organizational diagram**

prise that there are aircraft in all the military services, that the Navy has its organic landing force and that Army AAA units participate in air defense.

What the report does, in this regard, is to confuse instruments with missions; means with employment. Surely the authors know that such duplications as the above are not simply the result of careless drafting by the Congress and the insatiable desire of the Services to be self-sufficient. Surely they know that Congress considered the matter of Naval and Army aviation and the Marine Corps in great detail. Certainly they know that some duplication of instruments is planned into our defense structure simply because it results in far greater effectiveness than if the same means were distributed among the elemental land, air, sea bins.

This does not mean that such duplications should not be kept under strict surveillance, and reexamined from time to time. But they should be examined on their individual merits, not by an arbitrary rule of thumb; and the touchstone is combat effectiveness, not administrative tidiness or compatibility with a neat symmetrical organizational diagram worked out by someone who has no real knowledge of military operations.

It was Herr Goebbels who observed that propaganda must always be simple and repetitious—that public opinion could be influenced only by forever repeating a thesis in the most simplified terms. That this principle is observed by the Rockefeller report as well as the Kissinger book cannot be gainsaid.

No less than 12 times there appears in the report in one form or another the unsupported statement, "revolutionary advances in weapons

have rendered obsolete the present missions of the military services."

Actually there is considerable ground for postulating just the opposite; that advances in weapons have actually validated the original service missions. For example, the developments of the surface to surface missile and anti-aircraft missile have made the Field Army more self-sufficient and lessened its dependence on the Air Force for tactical air support and air defense. The ICBM, with its intercontinental range, has lessened the Air Force's dependence upon the Army and the Navy for protecting or for seizing advance bases. Mass destruction weapons and missile development have reduced the requirements of both the Air Force and the Navy for aircraft so that this long smoldering jurisdictional dispute will eventually be alleviated.

In respect to missiles and aircraft, there will still be some duplication of instruments between the services but it is because such instruments are a part of an integrated fabric of weapons for air war, sea war and land war. It is up to the services and to the Secretary of Defense to guide this weapons development so as to prevent duplications which do not spell increased effectiveness.

To give Kissinger his due, there are some grounds for the observation that the military services have been competing with one another in the development of weapons for an identical function . . . but such competition is not inherent in the roles and missions. However, given certain circumstances, the technical developments of one military service toward the fulfillment of its legitimate mission may impinge on the mission of another to an extent resulting in wasteful duplication. The Army's development of Jupiter, a

1500-mile IRBM, is an example. In developing weapons to "command the land," the Army progressed from Corporal to Sergeant to Redstone, a 200-mile surface missile. Then its engineers and scientists, always striving for something bigger and better, saw possibilities for, and eventually developed the Jupiter.

Here, advancing technology clearly crossed a service boundary—the Army got into the Air Force's assigned business—a development which was encouraged by the Air Force's failure to appreciate the potentialities of the ballistic missile. But here the Secretary of Defense stepped in and by firm decision put a stop to the Army's duplication of an Air Force mission.

Another example of overstepping the bounds of roles and missions is to be found in the air defense field. By the most reasonable interpretation of the Functions Paper, the defense of the US against air attack is an Air Force job. Yet the Army's development effort in Nike, Nike Hercules and Nike Zeus is headed in that direction.

Here again it was the failure of the Air Force to stay ahead in new weapons that created the vacuum which the Army effort sought to satisfy.

A final example of intrusion into a field which can not be identified with its prescribed functions is the Army's earth satellite venture. But while there is nothing in the roles and missions to warrant Army ventures in this field, who is there who can blame the Army for stepping into the breach and improving our security posture?

The fault then is not in the roles and missions, but in failure to observe these terms. To be sure, even with the best of good will on the part of the Services, decisions must

... while air transport is feasible for small troop units, it is not feasible for large scale movements. Sea lift will get them there first, with more assurance and greater economy

be made from time to time as to which service or services will employ this weapon or that. These same decisions would have to be made regardless of the organization of the armed forces. And the fact that decisions such as these must be made from time to time with advances in technology does not invalidate the basic missions of the services, which are as sound now as when they were formulated 10 years ago.

To better control this type of duplication which results not from any flaw in the roles and missions, but from unreasonable and overzealous interpretations, new weapons development has recently been taken out of the military services. Now when a new weapon has been developed and is ready for introduction into the defense structure, a hard decision can be made as to which service or services will employ it. But the decision will be sound only if the military experts are given their day in court.

Roles and Missions Result in Neglect of Certain Vital Tasks

Complementing its contention that their roles and missions make inevitable the duplication of functions by the four armed services, the Rockefeller report charges that they also lead to the neglect of certain vital tasks. Cited as an example is airlift for land forces. Noting that this is the responsibility of the Air Force, the report alleges that the Air Force has failed to meet the requirements because of its greater concern with its primary task of defeating the enemy in the air. This is less than accurate.

To begin with, the provision of air lift is a combatant function only in the same sense as the provision of sea lift. Essentially, it is an administrative function—one which has been placed under the single management of the Air Force.

Next, the matter of airlift for the strategic movement of land forces has been the subject of numerous studies, all of which have been essentially negative as to its feasibility. The fact is, that airlift of the scope envisaged by some enthusiasts is just

not feasible. In the present state of the art of aircraft design, the cost would be prohibitive, even if fuel and maintenance facilities could be moved in sufficient quantity and flexibility.

It is not solely a question of economics; there is the lack, at potential destinations, of the major airfield complexes needed to handle the great numbers of large aircraft required for a major airlift. While air transport is feasible for small troop units, it is not feasible for large scale movements. Sea lift will get them there first, with more assurance and greater economy.

Finally, decisions as to the amount of airlift to be maintained have not been left to the Air Force, which would be more than happy to attempt to meet any requirement levied upon it, provided it were given the means. The decisions have been made by the Secretary of Defense, after consideration of all relevant views. These decisions in turn have been ratified by the Congress in its action upon budget requests and Congress was not uninformed in the premises, for it has repeatedly probed the amount of airlift to be maintained. Thus, there is just no basis in fact for the claim that air lift has been neglected as a result of service missions.

No "Limited War" Doctrine

Associated in a general way with roles and missions as treated by Kissinger, is his charge that the US has no doctrine for limited war. In fact, this charge becomes his principal basis for rationalizing his "limited war force." Create a command, he says, and the doctrine will follow. This thesis overlooks the fact that if you were to place in one compartment all our military forces except SAC and CONAD you would put in the same compartment hundreds of volumes of doctrine—doctrine for land warfare, for tactical air warfare, for naval warfare and for joint operations.

There is no shortage of doctrine for fighting limited war and it is good doctrine expressed in meaning-

ful military terms. But we can agree with Kissinger that there does not exist at the present time, specifically oriented to his purposes, a highly rationalized doctrine for attempting to limit a limited war. If this is needed, such a doctrine can be developed without destroying our present compartmentation for effective military action.

But its desirability is at least open to question. While the concept of limited war is a valid one within reason, it is extremely unlikely that operations of the scope visualized by Kissinger could be conducted without spreading. Moreover, developing a doctrine for limiting war so as to permit, let us say, a nice Marquis of Queensbury atomic war in Western Europe would, if it could be done at all, simply rob our massive deterrent of its capacity to deter any aggressive Soviet action short of the initiation of the hydrogen exchange of mutual extinction itself. Thus, it would encourage the Soviets in military activities in which their capabilities are greater than ours by virtue of their interior lines, shorter lines of communication and greater manpower.

While everyone would agree that we ought to be prepared to respond to Soviet recourse to limited war, this is a very different thing from deliberately setting out to expand the probability of war.

Inadequate Limited War Forces

A derivative of Kissinger's purported rediscovery of limited war is his claim that our strategic concept has over-emphasized the massive deterrent to the point of seriously neglecting limited war forces. It is quite possible to agree with Kissinger that there has been far too much talk about the massive deterrent. But ever since the exposure of the shortcomings of the strategy of massive deterrence at the time of the Korean War, the US has maintained substantially improved "limited war" capabilities. Nevertheless there is room for significant extension of mobility—inherent in sea going forces, and applicable to the full

. . . The "numbers-of-divisions" gauge, which is grossly misleading, should be discarded as a measure of quantitative strengths

spectrum of modern warfare.

As of today, the US has approximate numerical air parity with the Soviet Union and, if experience in the Korean War is valid, a clear superiority in pilot competence. The US has a decisive naval superiority including a significant capability to project naval power ashore. In fact, it was Congressional appreciation of the increased need for ready expeditionary forces for limited war situations, that caused Congress in 1952 to enact legislation to increase significantly the size of the Fleet Marine Forces and to specify that they should not be reduced below 3 divisions and 3 air wings.

As for the Army, the numerical superiority of some 175 Soviet divisions to some 17 American is grossly misleading. The Red Army actually requires vast supporting establishments similar to those of other modern armies, and a major segment of its over-all strength must in fact be diverted to non-tactical functions. The explanation of how the 2½ million-man Red Army achieves 10 times more divisions than the US Army of almost half its strength, lies in differences of organizational policy; many of the so-called Soviet divisions are merely "cadre" units, and other full active divisions are fractionally manned.

Additionally, Red Army divisions are provided less tactical and logistical support units, and thus have less staying-power than American units. Thus, the numbers of divisions are more reflective of organizational and manning policy differences than relative quantitative strengths. The "numbers-of-divisions" gauge, which is grossly misleading, should be discarded as a measure of quantitative strengths in favor of army wide strengths—now a little better than two-to-one in numerical favor of the Soviets.

And this is the US alone. There is no time here to inventory the free world forces allied with us or to examine the forces of the satellites which are at best a dubious asset to the Soviets and may be a source of weakness. This is not necessary to the conclusion that the US actually

has in being very substantial limited war capabilities.

Conclusions

1) Contrary to the Rockefeller-Kissinger assumption, the military services are not organized on the basis of their means of locomotion but on a purposive basis—to provide forces organized, equipped and trained primarily to command the sea, to command the land and to command the air.

2) Contrary to the Rockefeller-Kissinger assertion, there is in this purposive type of organization little duplication of functions. The planned duplication of instruments results in greater overall effectiveness without an increase in total means. Reorganization along tri-elemental lines would not result in economy—only a less effective distribution of instruments.

3) A fact apparently overlooked by Rockefeller-Kissinger—the Army has not been assigned the task of winning a war on land, the Navy at sea, the Air Force in the air. These tasks are the responsibility of unified commanders appointed in each strategic area. The services merely provide forces for what is, in effect, a task organization tailored for a specific, integrated mission.

4) The Rockefeller-Kissinger effort to divide the whole spectrum of warfare into distinct and separate entities "total war" and "limited war" is unrealistic. Moreover, to attempt, as they propose, to compartment our military forces on this basis would produce rigidity in place of flexibility in responding to the versatile Communist threat, and to maintain 2 completely self-sufficient forces would greatly increase the cost of the armed forces.

5) The administrative compartmentation of the armed forces on the broad bases of land power, sea power and air power is far more responsive to the principal military threats to our national security than would be compartmentation, as proposed by Rockefeller-Kissinger, on the basis of 2 distinct entities, "total war" and an amorphous agglomerate, "limited war."

6) The so-called "traditional" roles and missions, which were actually established in 1947, far from being outmoded by new weapons, as charged by Rockefeller-Kissinger, have actually been validated by the new weapons, particularly missiles. Decisions are needed from time to time as to what service or services will use a new weapon, but this does not invalidate the roles and missions. The same type of decisions would have to be made within the "limited war force" and between that force and the "total war force."

7) Destructive competition between the services is not inherent in the roles and missions, as alleged by Rockefeller-Kissinger, but results from defiance of the roles and missions by an over-zealous service. In most cases, notably Jupiter, Nike Zeus and the earth satellite, these challenges have been invited by neglect on the part of the service with primary responsibility for development in a certain field, and the challenges by another service have speeded the development of new weapons and strengthened our military posture.

8) Contrary to Rockefeller-Kissinger, the roles and missions have not resulted in the neglect of certain vital tasks. For example, the amount of air lift to be maintained was decided by the politically accountable civilian Secretary of Defense with the benefit of all relevant points of view.

9) Contrary to Kissinger, there exists a large body of doctrine for limited war. A more highly rationalized doctrine for attempting to limit a limited war could be developed, if it were determined to be desirable, without a revolutionary reorganization of the military forces.

10) Although the strategy of the massive deterrent has been highly publicized, the need for a capacity for limited war has never been forgotten. Kissinger notwithstanding, the US has maintained, since the beginning of the Korean War in 1950, tremendous capabilities for conducting limited war—though they demand continuing improvement.

US MC



ROLL FUEL TRANS



An unusual new rolling fluid transporter, Drive Auto Company, utilizing containers from the Rubber Company, transports 500 gallons per

By making the fluid containers their own, transporting the load on trucks or other vehicles, liquids over sand, mud, swampland, boulders, ground as well as ice and deep snow.

Individual manpower can be used for many distances over level ground. The FWD design container at a rate of 50 to 100 gallons a minute, system for direct pumping of aviation fuel, emptied by gravity, pressure or vacuum systems.

The fluid transporters can be used to transport aircraft and missiles over adverse terrain and other vehicles in military operations.

The tire bags require no maintenance and need only periodic greasing of axle bearings. The rubber containers can be towed after tapping them with atmospheric air pressure or low pressure air or gas.





LLING TRANSPORTER


fluid transporter engineered by the Four Wheel
g containers developed by Goodyear Tire and
500 galls per container.

ers the own mobile carriers, instead of trans-
other vehicles, the fluid transporter can move
upland boulders, side slopes, hills and rough
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


✦ A mine detector weighing only one-fourth as much as the current standard model has been developed by the US Army Engineer Research and Development Laboratories, Fort Belvoir, Va.



Built by the Texas Instruments, Inc., Dallas, Texas, the seven-pound detector, designed to locate mines with metal components, is equipped with transistors instead of electron tubes. It has 4 times the battery life of the standard model. In addition to reducing over-all weight, sensitivity has been increased and stability improved. Maintenance, always a problem in the field, has been simplified to such a degree that operators can perform major repairs.


✦ A unique new 55-gallon steel drum which interlocks with adjacent containers when any number are unitized or packed closely together has been developed as a means of saving space and reducing handling and shipping costs.



The new drum was developed by the Signode Steel Strapping Company in conjunction with Vulcan Containers Inc. of Bellwood, Ill.

The whole key to the interlocking feature is the special design of the rolling hoops. These are slightly offset—alternately raised and lowered—on opposite sides of the drum. When unitized, a group of the new drums can be handled by a standard lift truck without the necessity of costly wood pallets.

✦ Carbon microphones widely used for mobile radio transmitters now can be quickly converted into more reliable and intelligible transistorized magnetic microphones in just a few minutes with a new kit manufactured by Shure Brothers, Inc., of Evanston, Ill. To accomplish



the conversion, a screwdriver, long-nosed pliers and soldering iron are the only tools needed. Shown at top of photo, the kit consisting of tiny transistorized amplifier and controlled magnetic cartridge, is placed beside open microphone case. Transistorized amplifier as pictured at bottom of photo, is held in place by screw of the press-to-talk switch. The controlled magnetic cartridge is substituted for carbon cartridge. Wires originally leading to the carbon cartridge are soldered to transistorized amplifier, while leads from amplifier are soldered to new cartridge. The transistorized microphone features greater durability than the carbon unit.

✦ Britain's HMS Victorious, veteran of famous WWII actions, has been rebuilt into one of the world's most up-to-date aircraft carriers at a cost of nearly \$42,000,000.

The sixth modern carrier to join the Royal Navy since the war, she is the



first to be fitted with all of the British-developed aids to naval flying—the fully angled flight deck, steam catapults and landing mirror sights.

First commissioned 16 years ago, the Victorious was in actions against the Bismarck and Tirpitz in 1941, 1942 and 1944; convoy escort trips to North Russia and Malta in 1942; and her air group covered the North Africa landings in 1942.


On 9 May 1945, she was hit on the flight deck by a Kamikaze aircraft but within a few hours was in action again.

✦ With the application of nuclear power, Navy submarines have become faster and more difficult to handle.

To cope with this problem, and give new sailors the best possible dockside training, the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics Corporation built an electronic training device called the Universal Submarine Simulator.

Installed at the US Submarine Base at Groton, Connecticut, the trainer is run by a roomful of electronic computers which act as its engine room, diving planes, ballast system and ocean.

Included in the electronic computers is a direct writing six-channel oscillograph manufactured by Brush Instruments Division of Clevite Corporation which accurately evaluates the progress of student crews.



AROUND THE WORLD WITH SIKORSKY HELICOPTERS



45 TONS PER HOUR—In northern Norway, pilots of the U. S. Army's 8th Helicopter Battalion carried loads of building materials, steel, electronic equipment, and even dynamite to mountain-top sites of micro-wave relay stations. The H-34As (Sikorsky S-58s) delivered their cargo at the rate of 1½ tons every 2 minutes.



LIFTING THE LANTERN—An HR2S-1 (Sikorsky S-56) from the Second Marine Aircraft Wing places a 1740-lb. lantern atop a new 142-foot lighthouse at Cape Fear, N. C., with only 6 inches of clearance on the sides. Hovering stability for this difficult job was provided by Sikorsky's Automatic Stabilization Equipment in the HR2S-1.



52 RESCUED—The crew of the grounded French freighter *Pei-Ho* were flown ashore near Casablanca, Morocco, by an H-19 (Sikorsky S-55) of the Air Force's Air Rescue Service, which is on duty around the world. All 52 of the crew were rescued. The H-19 came from the U. S. base at Port Lyautey.



SIKORSKY AIRCRAFT

STRATFORD, CONNECTICUT

One of the Divisions of United Aircraft Corporation



Capt McLane Tilton, USMC

Herewith we conclude the fascinating narrative
of Capt Tilton, a Marine officer who lived in
relatively peaceful times but not in peaceful places



Capt McLane Tilton

and the Korean Incident of
1871

By Maj C. F. Runyan

Part II

A Mission Is Undertaken

✻ THROUGHOUT HIS CONSIDERABLE CAREER IN PUBLIC LIFE, FREDERICK Ferdinand Low, the American Minister to China, was never to be confronted with a more difficult or frustrating assignment than that of attempting to break through the barrier to trade and intercourse that Korea had erected against the Western nations.

It was a nearly impossible task that the State Department had given Low, and the gains to be had from its successful accomplishment were really too small to counterbalance the American lives and American prestige that failure would cost. The futility of forcing a trade treaty at this time should have been clear to the policy makers in Washington had they given sober reflection to the violence of Korean feelings as expressed in the anti-Christian blood-bath, the *Gen Sherman* Massacre and the repulse of the Russians and the French during the previous decade. Add to this basically bad beginning a chief negotiator such as Low with no diplomatic background nor any experience in the Far East and all the ingredients for a classic misadventure were in the making.

During the winter of 1870-1871, Minister Low and the Consul General at Shanghai, Mr. Seward, exhausted every resource to persuade the Chinese government to intercede on behalf of the American government in arranging a time and place for a meeting between representatives of the Korean and the United States governments. This the Chinese Foreign Office steadfastly refused to do, disclaiming any sovereignty over Korea and insisting that any intervention by the Chinese government in the affairs of the Hermit Kingdom was completely out

of the question. Indeed, it was only after repeated personal visits by the aggressive American Minister that the Foreign Office in Peking consented to deliver a letter from the United States government via the courier chain between China and Korea. The desire of Chinese officialdom to remain aloof from the entire matter was best expressed in a letter to Mr. Low dated 28 March 1871, notable for its petulant tone:

"... In all the relations of China with its dependent states the long-established rules of the Board of Rites had never contained any provision about forwarding letters to them; the permission granted [by the Emperor] for it to do such a thing was therefore only for this occasion; it was an extraordinary favor, quite in excess of usage, and one which could not, on any account, be again granted. . . ."

It was obvious that there would be no further help from the government of China. It was now up to Frederick Low, Adm Rodgers and the Asiatic Fleet to do what they could.

Early in May, 1871, the Minister and his party came aboard the *Colorado* at Shanghai to begin the first leg of the voyage to Korea. Mr. Low's party consisted of Mr. E. B. Drew, the Assistant Secretary of the Legation; Mr. John B. Cowles, the Acting Secretary of the Legation and a competent interpreter of the Chinese language, and 2 Chinese interpreters with a knowledge of Korean dialects. Owing to some difficulties in arranging for the repair of the



The USS Colorado anchors near Inchon — 1871

Ashuelot which Adm Rodgers wanted to see settled before departure, the *Colorado* did not leave Shanghai for the rendezvous at Nagasaki, Japan, until the 8th of May, in company with the *Monocacy* and *Palos*.


Arriving at Nagasaki on the 12th of May, Adm Rodgers found the *Alaska* and the *Benicia* waiting for him. The expeditionary fleet was now complete, consisting of the Flagship *Colorado*, the *Alaska*, the *Benicia*, and the gunboats *Monocacy* and *Palos*. This was the sum total of the Asiatic Fleet that could be gathered together at this time. The other two ships of the Fleet were the *Ashuelot*, repairing at Shanghai, and *Idaho*, the stores and hospital ship.

Adm Rodgers wasted no time in getting started training the Landing Force. During the 4 days at Nagasaki, in spite of fog and heavy rains,

the companies were exercised in embarking aboard the boats, and the boats themselves were overhauled, with particular attention paid to the steam launches which, because of their shallow draft, would bear the brunt of harbor and river surveys, and if force had to be used, would carry the Landing Force onto hostile beaches. On the 16th of May, the Fleet sailed for Korea.

The track of the Squadron led the ships northwest from Nagasaki, then directly west passing to the south of Quelpart Island, then straight north along the west coast of Korea. On the 19th of May the Fleet arrived at the Ferrieres Islands, about 25 miles from the mainland, and owing to thick fogs was unable to proceed further until the 23d of May when Rodgers ordered the ships to move to Eugenie Island (Ipp'a-do) in the Golfe de L'Imperatrice (Prince Jerome Gulf). The Fleet maneuvered cautiously through the uncharted waters of the Korean west coast even though the Fleet Navigator had obtained the French charts used by Adm Roze's force during the abortive expedition of the French in the fall of 1866. These charts, although later found to be meticulously correct in the information drawn upon them, were treated as suspect by the Squadron until proved otherwise. During the next 3 weeks the American officers were to regret that the charts, although accurate so far as they went, were not more complete.

At the anchorage near Eugenie Island, which Adm Rodgers named Roze Roads, the ships of the Squad-



The USS Monocacy — fire support ship for the landing

ion were about 50 miles from Seoul by air line and about 90 miles by water. For the ships to get to Seoul, they would have to first proceed to the north across the Gulf, up the Salee River (Yom-ha) to where it joined the Han-gang and then down the Han to Seoul. To Adm Rodgers' way of thinking, it was too far from the Flagship for his gunboats, the *Monocacy* and *Palos*, to go and, of course, impossible for his 3 deep-draft men-o-war. It was plain that a closer anchorage was needed. Also the French charts indicated that a land road to Seoul terminated near Boissée Island.

On the 24th of May, Adm Rodgers dispatched the *Palos* and 4 steam-launches to make a survey of the Gulf under the command of Cdr H. C. Blake, captain of the *Alaska*, a tall fire-eater who, with his heavy greying beard and glasses, looked more like a schoolmaster than the excellent and courageous naval officer he was. Blake and his party were directed to proceed as far up the channel as the Ile Boissée (Chagyak-to), distant about 24 miles above Roze Roads. The party was gone 4 days, returning to Roze Roads on the evening of the 28th of May. Cdr Blake reported to Adm Rodgers that there had been no active hostility displayed by the natives, but that on the large island (Yongjong-do) near Boissée, there had been a demonstration of about 200 armed civilians waving banners and brandishing lances as the boats went past. Blake also reported that the Boissée anchorage would accommodate the Fleet and it could be moved almost 25 miles closer to Seoul.

On Monday, the 29th of May, the Fleet got under way and proceeded toward the Boissée anchorage, but again the fog closed in until reference points on the shore were obscured and the ships were forced to anchor in the channel. The following morning, the 30th, the fog lifted and the ships proceeded through the passage between the mainland and the island of Yongjong-do and anchored between Ile Boissée (Chagyak-to) and Ile Guerriere (Yul-to). This anchorage was approximately 10 miles south of the mouth of the Salée River (Yom-ha) and about 70 miles from Seoul by water. (Nearly 80 years later, the giant descendant of Rodgers' small fleet supported

the landing of the 1st MarDiv at Inchon from almost this same position.)


As soon as the ships had dropped anchor, a junk appeared bearing some Koreans who when invited to come aboard the flagship, showed no hesitation in doing so. The officers and crew of the *Colorado* crowded around the orientals curiously, taking advantage of the first opportunity to inspect the Koreans at close range. The orientals were garbed in white cotton clothing from head to toe which contrasted markedly with their dark bronze skins. Their heads were round, with shiny black hair wound into a spiraled hank sticking straight up, giving a horned appearance. One of the Chinese interpreters in the American Minister's party questioned the Koreans and discovered that they were merely persons of inferior rank who had been sent as messengers to announce that 3 envoys would arrive in the morning to confer with the American party.

At 1000 the following morning the 3 Korean officials arrived in a junk from the direction of the land road to Seoul. They had another junk and a sampan in company and were attended by 20 other Koreans of inferior rank. They were received

at the Quarterdeck by the Officer of the Deck, LtCdr Wheeler, and Mr. Cowles, Mr. Drew and the 2 Chinese interpreters. In contrast to the dress of the Korean visitors of the previous day, 2 of the officials wore robes of dark blue cotton and gauze and a number of blue jade stone buttons were worn behind their ears attached by chains to their hats. They identified themselves as being officials of the 3d rank. The third envoy was of the 5th rank and wore dress of light blue, with a less number of jade buttons attached to his hat. According to the Chinese interpreters attached to the expedition, their rank was also indicated by the color of the umbrellas carried by the retainers, and the difference in the quality of the bamboo hats worn.

Minister Low, upon learning of the rank of the officials, felt that it would be a derogation of his position as Minister Plenipotentiary for him to receive officials of less than the 1st rank, so the Koreans were taken to the Admiral's office where the interview was conducted by Mr. Drew, the acting Secretary of the Legation.

Mr. Drew, during the interview, found that the officials had brought with them no letters or credentials



Korean officials aboard the USS Colorado

and as far as could be ascertained, had no authority to initiate negotiations. Under these circumstances, the American Minister and his advisors decided that a full statement of the purposes and objectives of the American expedition should not be given to these lesser officials. They were told, however, that the intentions of the force were peaceful, and pending arrival of officials of higher rank or a communication from the government, the Squadron would undertake soundings of the waters and surveys of the shores in the vicinity. To this the Koreans made no objection. Mr. Drew also spoke of the possibility of boat parties landing or proceeding up the river and expressed the hope that there would be no molestation of the Americans by the Koreans, and in order to give ample time for the news to reach the people in the vicinity, Mr. Drew stated that no movement by elements of the Squadron would be made for another 24 hours. To all this the Koreans appeared to assent.

Here, undoubtedly, is the point at which the American mission's chance for success, never in the ascendancy, plummeted downward. Much has been made of the tacit consent, or lack of objections by the Korean officials to the proposed survey expedition up the Salée River. But the point has never been made, either by Low or anyone else connected with the enterprise, why so much reliance was placed in officials of such inferior rank. After all, these were officials too far down the diplomatic scale to gain an audience with the Minister, yet it was taken for granted that these same officials had the power to order the defenses of Seoul lowered for the entrance of armed warships. The knowledge that both Low and Rodgers had of the recent history of the country's violent reactions against attempts to break her wall of isolation should have warned the Americans that sending gunboats towards Seoul would be a grave blunder. But just as the American government made a serious mistake in attempting to negotiate a treaty at this time, the mistake was compounded and extended by Low's ham-fisted handling of a situation that needed a most delicate touch.

Exactly 24 hours after the visit of

the Korean envoys, on the 1st of June, a surveying party left the Boissée anchorage under Blake's command again. The vessels carrying the party were the *Monocacy*, the *Palos*, a steam-launch from the *Alaska*, one from the *Benicia* and *Colorado*, and the *Colorado's* steam-cutter. Each of the steam-launches and the steam-cutter had one 12-pound howitzer aboard, the *Monocacy* had four 8" guns and two 60-pounder rifles, the *Palos* had four 24-pounder howitzers and two 24-pounder rifled howitzers.

The instructions given Cdr Blake by Adm Rodgers were to examine and survey the Salée River (Yom-ha) from the point at which it emptied into the bay up to the point at which it joined the River Seoul (Han-gang). This meant that the entire string of forts on the fortified island of Kang-wha-do, which were the major defenses of the Capital of Korea, would have to be passed by the survey party.

The party left the anchorage at exactly noon with the 4 steam-launches in line abreast leading. The *Palos* followed next with the *Monocacy* bringing up the rear. It was about 9 miles to the actual mouth of the Salée River (so-named by the French because of its high salt content) and the party reached it in about 2 hours. On the west bank of the river, near the mouth, was the first Korean fort of the many that lined the Salée all the way north to the Han Estuary. Although the members of the surveying party could see that the fort was manned, there were no shots fired or any other evidence of hostility. The 2 ships and 4 launches proceeded more slowly up the channel of the river itself, taking soundings as they went, the crews fighting to hold back speed against the powerful surge of the current. A thousand yards, two thousand, and a second and third fort, also on the west shore, were passed. Hundreds of soldiers began to appear along the banks and in the forts, all armed and occasionally waving flags, but there was no sound from the shore, just a quiet watchfulness. Another thousand yards and the river swung sharply to the right for a few hundred yards and then abruptly left again in a true hairpin turn. The French charts had marked this stretch of the river

"*Passage difficile*" and as the quarter-masters fought the wheels, they must have been in complete agreement with the description. Here the current reached its highest velocity, pushed by the tremendous tides and twisted into a violent turn; the waters spiraling into the whirlpools that made navigation a nightmare.

Suddenly a single shot rang out from the circular fortification on the highest ground overlooking the river. It was a general signal to the Koreans to commence firing. At least 3 forts on the left bank and one on the right bank began pouring small arms and cannon fire into the harassed flotilla. Fortunately, the fire was amazingly inaccurate, some of the cannon being fired in sequence by powder trains at pre-established points on the river. Almost instantaneously, the American ships began returning fire.

Cdr Blake had come prepared for the worst and the decks of the ships were cleared for action and the gun crews at their stations long before the party arrived at the mouth of the Salée. If the fire of the Koreans was inaccurate, the return fire of the American gun crews was deadly in its accuracy, the grape and shrapnel bursting over the parapets of the forts and solid shot breaching the walls. Within minutes the Americans could see the white-clothed figures of the orientals jumping off the walls and diving into the deep ravines behind the forts to escape the deadly American cannonade. During the exchange, the little force swept around the second turn of the river and came under the guns of a fifth fort that lay just beyond the bend. But the soldiers manning this fort had seen the futility of attempting to trade fire with the big guns of the American ships, and though the American guns were turned on this fort, there was no answering fire.

Clear at last of the tortuous waters of the bend in the river, Cdr Blake dropped anchor to take stock of the situation. Cdr McCrea almost immediately came aboard the *Palos*, reporting that the *Monocacy* had failed to negotiate the second turn and had swept wide to the right side of the channel, hitting some rocks that lay just below the surface of the water. The gunboat was leaking badly. The launches also re-

ported that most of their ammunition had been expended. It was obvious to Blake that though he had not covered a quarter of the distance the Admiral had ordered surveyed, the party was in no condition to proceed further. He gave the order to hoist anchor and return to the fleet anchorage. The return around the difficult passage of the river bend was slow, with the ships and launches fighting against the swift-running tide, but it gave the flotilla ample opportunity to expend the remainder of its ammunition on the now-quiet forts.

The American casualties of this action were 2: John Somerdyke, ordinary seaman, gunshot wound in the left shoulder, and James Cochran, ordinary seaman, loss of 2 fingers by recoil of a howitzer. Both men were in the *Alaska's* steam-launch.

Awaiting an Apology

Upon hearing of the attack, Rodgers was at first angrily determined to land the Fleet Landing Force in the morning and destroy the forts that had fired on his vessels. Reason prevailed, however, particularly when Cdr Blake emphasized the strength of the current that was running during the equinoctial tides. Blake pointed out that landing in a current that was running at 8 knots would make a coordinated assault almost impossible. Later that evening, the Admiral and Mr. Low discussed the matter and agreed that while waiting for neap tides, it would also be politic to set a reasonable time for the Korean government to forward an apology for its attack on the surveying party. It was decided, then, to wait 10 days and if at the end of that time no apology was forthcoming from Seoul, the Fleet would carry out an attack in force on the Salée River forts.

It seems that as the Admiral's temper cooled, the Honorable Mr. Low's grew more heated at the treatment his mission had so far received. He now conceived the idea that if an apology and disavowment of the attack on the surveying party was not received, Rodgers' plan of action should be to attack and destroy the offending forts in the lower reaches of the Salée River, and then proceed to the upper end of the stream, destroying forts enroute to the point

at which the Han River joins the Salée, and there to establish a blockade designed to bring the King of Korea to terms. Rodgers was less sanguine about the tactical merits of this plan. His force was not adapted to extended land fighting and he could not tie down the entire Asiatic Squadron in an indefinite blockade. The logic of Rodgers' arguments prevailed and the Minister agreed that retaliation should be confined to the lower forts which had fired on Blake's party.

Instead of messages being delivered by junk and sampan as they had been during the early days after the Fleet's arrival, a crude international post office was now established on Ile Guierriere near the Fleet anchorage. Letters both going and coming were attached to a pole set up on the beach. On the 3d of June, the boat crew of the *Colorado* picked up a communication from the Guardian of Foo-Ping Prefecture, an excerpt of which is quoted in translation:

" . . . There was formerly not a particle of ill-feeling existing between us. Why should arms now drag us into mutual resentment? Yet unless destruction lead [you] to repentance, you will again be taking upon you to constantly return toward us. What affairs would you transact? What words speak? Will you wish to take possession of our land, people, or will you want us to give away land and people, then let me ask how can 3,000 Li [1,000 miles] of river, hill, city and country be lightly thrown away? If will desire us to agree to negotiate and carry out friendly relations, then let me ask you how can 4,000 years ceremonies, music, literature, and all things, be without sufficient reason, broken up and cast away? It does not consist with right, it cannot be spoken of. . . . It would be better early to mark out a right course of action and each remain peacefully in his own place.

We inform you, that you may ponder and be enlightened. From the General."

At the direction of Mr. Low, Mr. Drew answered this letter on the 5th of June:

" . . . Your people have met our peaceful overtures by an unprovoked and wanton attack. The Admiral hopes that it will prove that

all this was done by the common people, without the sanction of the government; and has concluded to allow sufficient time to pass to enable the King to learn of it, and send an apology for this outrage if it was unauthorized, before taking any further steps.

"It is a question which His Majesty should seriously consider before taking up a war-like attitude. Five or six days longer will be allowed the government to consult and determine what it will do. . . ."

There were more exchanges of letters between the Minister and the Korean officials, but nothing in the Korean communications was construed by the American officers as an apology for the attack on the surveying party. And there were no indications that a high official would be sent to confer with the Minister. Low, who had held no high hopes for the success of this venture from the outset, was by now completely discouraged and angry at what he considered to be the hypocritical conduct of the Koreans. At this point, it would have required a sincere and persuasive effort on the part of the Korean government to get Low to call off the attack scheduled for the 10th of June.

In fairness to the Korean government, it should be recognized that during the 10-day period of grace granted by the Americans, the Koreans made several efforts toward conciliation. Unfortunately, the American officials demanded an apology that would meet the standards set for diplomatic relations between nations of the western world. That they did not get it is understandable. From the Korean viewpoint, the American warships had attempted to pass the defenses to Seoul, which they had been ordered to defend to the death by Royal Mandate. Did the Americans really expect the warning of minor officials to the Lieutenant General of Kangwha-do not to molest the warships to countermand the General's orders from his sovereign?

In a letter left on Ile Guerriere on the 6th of June signed by Chong, Guardian of the Prefecture of Kangwha-do:

" . . . When your honorable vessels, not considering the fixed regulations of another country, penetrated its important pass, how could

the officers appointed to guard the closed portals of the frontier whose duty it is to take measures of defense, calmly let it go by as of no consequence? Pray do not then be offended at what occurred. . . . The non-intercourse of Corea (sic) with foreign states is a settled principle, established by our ancestors of 5 centuries ago; a principle of which the whole world has heard. . . . It is precisely because we must not break through the ancient policy of our ancestors that we cannot discuss and cannot settle that which the honorable envoy desires to discuss and to settle, whatever it may be. Why do you then wait for a high official to meet you?"

Accompanying this letter was what surely must be considered a conciliatory gesture on the part of the Koreans. Gathered from the poor countryside were 3 bullocks, 50 chickens and 1,000 eggs. The last paragraph of the June 6 letter offers food to the Americans:

" . . . Appreciating the hardships of a voyage of 10,000 li of wind and wave, I send some worthless articles as a trifling assistance to your table, as becomes the host. I trust you will not refuse to receive them, though insignificant. . . ."

Needless to say, the Americans refused the offering.

The Landing Force Is Readied

After Cdr Blake's surveying party

returned from upstream and the decision was tentatively made to attack the forts, Capt Edward T. Nichols, Fleet Captain and Chief of Staff to Adm Rodgers, began work on a landing order for the Fleet Landing Force. To assist him, he enlisted the aid of LtCdr Winfield Scott Schley, a hard-working, aggressive young officer who was to act as Adjutant General of the Force. On the 5th of June, the order was published as a Fleet General Order.

Blake, with his knowledge of the river, and the location of the forts, was to command the Expeditionary Force. Cdr Kimberly volunteered for and was given command of the Landing Force. LtCdr Silas Casey, Executive Officer of the *Colorado*, was to command the infantry and LtCdr Cassel was to command the artillery. McLane Tilton, of course, was to command the Marines of the *Colorado*, *Alaska* and *Benicia*. The Marines were to act as advance guard and to provide protection for the front and flanks of the Force; placed in this position because of their "steadiness and discipline, and looked to with confidence in case of difficulty."

Besides providing the tactical formation for the landing (which was not followed), and the general order of march while ashore (which was followed), the order also contained certain necessary administrative details:

All hands were to carry blankets, done up in a roll, strapped over their shoulders. Each man was to carry his pot slung to his belt along with 2 days cooked rations. Sixty rounds of ammunition would be carried by the infantry, and the artillerymen were to carry cutlasses and pistols, their customary arms at battle stations. The expeditionary troop list was also included in the order:

Expeditionary Commander
Cdr H. C. Blake, USN
Landing Force Commander
Cdr L. A. Kimberly, USN
Adjutant General
LtCdr W. Scott Schley, USN
Signal Officer — Mr. Houston, USN
Commander of Infantry Force
LtCdr S. W. Casey, USN
Second-in-Command
LtCdr Wheeler, USN
Company A — LtCdr Heyerman, USN
Company B — Master Drake, USN
Company C — Lt Totten, USN
Company D — Lt McKee, USN
Company E — Lt McIlvaine, USN
Company F — Master Pillsbury, USN
Company G — Master McLean, USN
Company H — Master Brown, USN
Company I — Capt Tilton, USMC
Lt MacDonald, USMC
Company J — Lt Breese, USMC
Lt Mullany, USMC
Artillery Commander
LtCdr Cassel, USN
Right Battery — Lt Snow, USN
Left Battery — Lt Mead, USN
Right Section
Master Schroeder, USN
Left Section — Master Wadhams, USN
Right Center Section
Ens Bassett, USN
Left Center Section
Mate Greenway, USN
Pioneer Commander (36 men)
Mate Quinn, USN
Hospital Force Commander
(2 ass't surgeons, 12 men)
Passed Assistant Surgeon Wells, USN

Now that it was almost a certainty that the 10th of June would see the Landing Force landed, exercise and training for the companies, batteries and boat crews was accelerated. All ships of the Squadron were exercised at clearing ship for action, the launches and cutter crews drilled at manning the howitzers, and bluejackets and Marines instructed at bugle calls and drum rolls for land operations. The large



Adm Rodgers and his staff plan the attack on the forts



The Palos tows the Landing Force embarked in launches

ships exercised at getting up yards, stays and water whips for loading howitzers and provisions into smaller craft. The seamen of the Landing Force were exercised at the manual of arms and instructed in loading, aiming and unloading the new Remington breech-loading carbines with which they would be armed. (Capt Tilton was probably the most qualified person in the Fleet to give instruction on the new carbine. In 1869 he served as Marine Corps member of a Navy Board which made exhaustive studies towards adoption of a new breech-loader for Navy use.) Finally, in a full dress review, the Admiral ordered all the "companies of infantry, the field batteries of artillery, and the pioneers, sappers and miners and hospital corps be assembled, and passed in review."

On the 9th of June, the *Monocacy* edged alongside the larger *Colorado* and two 9-inch guns of the *Colorado's* quarterdeck battery, 30 rounds of 9-inch grape, 30 rounds of 9-inch shrapnel and 10 rounds of canister were loaded aboard her. The preparations for moving up the river were complete.

The Landings — June 10

At 1000 the 10th of June, the Gunboat *Monocacy* weighed anchor, and in company with 2 steam launches steamed north towards the mouth of the Salée River to act as the Expeditionary fire-support ship. The first mission of the *Monocacy* was to drive the Koreans from the fort and its redoubt before the Landing Force landed.

At 1030 the *Palos*, towing 22 launches, cutters and boats with 546 naval officers and men, 4 Marine officers and 105 Marines embarked, started up the channel in the wake of the *Monocacy*.

Just before noon, the *Monocacy* reached a point in the river about 800 yards below the fort and began lobbing shells into it. As the *Monocacy* continued to steam towards the fort, the narrowness of the river channel directly abreast the walls forced the ship to pass within 300 yards of the defenders' guns. At the closest point, the Koreans began returning the American fire, but as in the engagement of the surveying party 10 days before, the orientals' fire was inaccurate and ineffective. The standing rigging of the *Monocacy* was cut by some of the rounds passing overhead, and a few balls lodged in the hammock-nettings, but no casualties were suffered.

The gunboat continued up the river past the bottleneck at the fort and Cdr McCrea ordered the anchor dropped at a spot about 500 yards above the fort. From this point, with the fort and redoubt bearing south south-west, McCrea poured a withering fire into the fort, demolishing the north and river faces of the redoubt, which extended 100 yards along the river edge from the fort proper. At 1230, about one-half hour after firing on the fort began, all fire from the fort ceased.


By this time, the *Palos*, looking like a mother hen with a large family, hove into view with her 22 boats strung out behind her and anchored a few hundred yards below the fort, and about a thousand yards below the *Monocacy* whose guns were still thundering at the now silent fort. The original plan had envisioned a landing supported by overhead or slightly angled fire from the fire-support ship, but Cdr Blake was influenced by the advice of LtCdr Picking, who was commanding all the steam-launches. Picking had come along side the *Palos* with the information that a spot below the fort

looked like the best beach for the landing.

Blake, squinting through his glasses at the distant beach, immediately agreed and at 1243 gave the order to land the Landing Force. Two minutes later the first boats touched the "beach." This change in plans was perhaps the only bad tactical decision of the entire operation. The first and most obvious criticism was that it threw the Landing Force into the line of fire of the *Monocacy*. Granted that the fort itself was generally between the Landing Force and the fire-support ship, it was still a lucky chance that ricochets and long rounds did not fall among the boats and troops. Fortunately, no casualties did occur.

The second fault of the landing area that Picking had chosen, and this was one of major proportions, was that the "beach" was no beach at all, it was a mud-flat! As the first men leaped from the boats and landed in the soft, tenacious mud, curses and yells filled the air. The nearest solid ground was over 400 yards away and guns, ammunition caissons and provisions had to be hauled through the greyish-brown morass. As the howitzers were rolled over the gunwales of the launches and dropped into the mud, they sank down until their axles disappeared from sight. The gun crews were powerless to move the guns towards firm ground.

Cdr Kimberly, standing in mud to his knees, his long, black moustachio forming weary semi-circles around his mouth, must have wished heartily that he had not been so eager to volunteer to command the Landing Force. LtCdr Douglas Cassel, whose artillery was now immobilized, asked Kimberly for additional men to help the sweating crews straining at the gun wheels



The French chart used by Adm Rodgers' expedition

and carriages. If he didn't get them, the batteries would stay where they were. Kimberly wasted no time in sending the Pioneers and several infantry companies to Cassel's aid.

As the artillerymen struggled with their guns, Capt Tilton formed his Marines into 2 long skirmish lines with their right flanks on the river and their left flanks extending towards solid ground several hundred yards away. The main body of infantry seamen formed into ragged lines behind the Marines. The advance began with rifles loaded and at the ready. There was still no firing from the fort, though black heads could be seen peering over the escarpments at the advancing troops and ducking down when a shell from the now slowly-firing *Monocacy* struck in and around the fort. Finally, the combination of the shelling and the plodding inexorable advance of the Marines proved too much for the remaining defenders. With frustrated yells of defiance, white-clothed figures began pouring over the walls and scurried to the west and north, firing a few futile shots as they ran. A signal went up from the *Palos*, and the *Monocacy* ceased firing. In a few minutes, the Marines poured into the fort to find it occupied only by dead bodies. Tilton threw up his own defenses inside and around the fort and held there awaiting the arrival of the main body.

Cdr McCrea, when he saw the

signal from the *Palos* to lift his fire, wiped the sweat pouring down his face from his bald head, and turned his attentions to the next fort up the river about 900 yards. The *Monocacy* weighed anchor and steamed slowly towards this second fortification which lay on a projection of land at a height of about 50 feet above the river. When he was within 500 yards of the place, McCrea ordered the anchor dropped and the guns of the American ship began a systematic destruction of the walls and occupants. The fort, an apparently well-constructed rock and mortar edifice of about 100 feet to a side, returned the fire for a considerable while, but the notorious inaccuracy of the Korean batteries saved the *Monocacy* from damage. The fire-support ship silenced the fort and except for an occasional shell thrown at targets of opportunity appearing on shore, the *Monocacy* remained quiet throughout the night.

Back at the first fort, called the "Marine Redoubt" in honor of the Marines, the artillery batteries finally struggled to firm ground at 1630. Hot, disheveled and exhausted, the artillerymen glared at the Marines and the bluejacket infantry who for the past 3 hours had stood a relaxed guard to the north and west. The gumbo had been so tenacious that the sailors had lost shoes, gaiters and even part of their trousers in the mud. Most of the Landing Force looked as though they had


been campaigning for weeks instead of hours.

Taking the weariness of the artillerymen into account, Kimberly decided to go no further that night and to bivouac the Landing Force near the site of the fort. For purposes of security, Tilton was ordered to reconnoiter ahead through the small village and fields just to the north. The Marines moved out along the narrow road running from the fort through the village and meandering across the rice paddies in a generally northwesterly direction. Finding no Koreans during his reconnaissance, Tilton decided to establish his camp for the night on a small hill about one-third mile to the north of the main body. This hill was later found to be a Korean burial ground. From this point he put out pickets, divided his command into 3 reliefs, one to be on the alert at all times, and turned in among the graves of the long-dead for his first-night's sleep on Korean soil.

The main body, bivouacked on a slightly raised plateau just behind the now-raised Marine Redoubt, also turned in for the night after establishing local security. Both the Marines and the bluejackets were to discover, as many of their great-grandsons 80 years later were to discover, that the Korean soldier stayed up late. About midnight, screams and howls, intermixed with the firing of small arms were heard from a short distance inland. LtCdr Silas Casey, the infantry commander, ordered the drummers to beat the long-roll and the men fell in quickly, prepared to fight a night battle. Cassel's artillery was unlimbered and fired a few rounds in the direction of the noise, which served to quiet the restless orientals, and a few minutes later retreat was sounded and the men returned to their blankets.

The Assault — June 11

At 0400 the following morning, as the first grey light of the false dawn came stealing over the mainland, the bugler's reveille echoed across the glassy rice paddies and down through the still, dark ravines to the north of the American positions. Stiff and tired from their unaccustomed exertions of yesterday and the poor substitute of rocky soil for restful hammocks, sailors and



Chart, drawn by Lt Totten in 1871, of the specific areas of action


Marines and solid ground for the advance of the artillery, running between rice paddies on the left and the mud banks of the river on the right.

Upon reaching the line of low wooded hills without opposition, Tilton changed his formation from a column to a skirmish line which he extended across the small peninsula upon which the fort stood, and to the rear of it. Moving cautiously towards the silent fortification, the Marines advanced until the landward wall could be observed from their positions in a wooded area raised slightly above the level of the fort. There was no sign of life on the walls, but brass cannon could be seen, trained towards the river. Holding two-thirds of his force in concealment as a base of fire, Tilton sent his remaining Marines forward. They moved stealthily down out of the woods towards the fort, keeping well-dispersed and momentarily expecting a hail of bullets from the hidden defenders. As they reached the walls, the Marines quickly moved through the ominously dark entrance cut into the stone walls, disappeared from view for a few seconds, and then reappeared waving the rest of the force on. The fort was deserted, mute evidence that the sharp-shooting crew of the *Monocacy* had done their work well the afternoon before. It was just 0800 Sunday morning.

While waiting for the main body

Marines began stirring about, putting on their shoes and gaiters, rolling blanket rolls and starting little fires to heat their tea and coffee. After breakfast, Co C, under Lt Totten, along with the Pioneers under Mate Quinn, was sent back into the Redoubt to complete the destruction of the walls, buildings and guns. Quantities of rice and dried fish were destroyed and such huts and buildings that were obviously being used for military purposes were burned.

At 0700, LtCdr Silas Casey directed Tilton to push his Marines across the flat land towards the higher ground to the north, on which the second fort stood. The narrow path which led from the first night's encampment was suitable for Capt Tilton's purpose. It angled away from the river, leading generally towards the rear of the second fortification, and gave dry footing for the



Aerial photo (1954) of area outlined in chart above



Navy Infantry Company inside Marine Redoubt after its capture

to move up, the Marines started dismantling the fort, tearing down the stone parapet to the level of the banquette on the side facing the river. About 30 cannon, some of which were still-loaded 32-pounders, were thrown over the wall facing the river, and Marine Bugler English jumped down off the 12-foot wall of the fort to roll the cannon off the precipice into the river. Master John Pillsbury soon arrived with his company and gave the Marines a hand in the destruction of the walls and destroying military stores. (Ranked between Ensign and Lieutenant, the title of "Master" was changed to "Lieutenant Junior Grade" in 1883.)

Before the destruction was complete, Kimberly ordered Tilton to take the lead again and scout the route leading to the main fortification, called the "Citadel" by the Americans, about a mile and a half distant. Tilton put flankers out on both sides of the route of advance, scouring the scrubby woods and fields of grain, occasionally stirring up unarmed natives whom the Marines permitted to scamper off unmolested. The main body followed in 4 roughly aligned columns with 2 pieces of artillery at the head of the column, 3 pieces near the center and the remaining 2 bringing up the rear.

As the terrain became more deeply cleft with ravines and crossed with sharp ridges, all semblance of a road disappeared. The sun was now blazing down on the dense undergrowth which threw it back in shimmering heat waves through which the blue-clad column slowly advanced. It was rough going for the infantry, particularly the Marine skirmishers flanking the column, but it was sheer back-breaking torment for the artillerymen as they pulled and shoved the heavy howitzers and their caissons up and down the tortuous route. Time after time, companies of infantry had to be detailed to aid the exhausted cannoneers manhandle the guns forward.

After advancing about a half mile from the second fort, named Fort Monocacy in just tribute to the accuracy of the gunboat's batteries, the Landing Force was hit by small arms fire. The firing, in ragged volleys, was being directed at the column from a high ridge to the front and left of the Force. The left flankers, on Tilton's orders, wheeled and struggled upwards toward the Koreans, who retreated to the next ridge parallel to the route of march. There they continued firing their muskets and jingalls (A crude, unrifled musket usually fired from a rest, though sometimes a team of 2 men fired the piece with one man

holding the muzzle on his shoulder; peculiar to central Asia.) at the main body, but poor marksmanship and distance combined to spare the Americans any casualties. To save diverting the flankers further, an artillery piece was brought up by LtCdr Cassel and his men through superhuman effort, and a few shells thrown at the Koreans, dispersing them, and the Landing Force pushed on.

It was the middle of the morning now, and as the sun-baked column slogged painfully on, the officers became aware of a menacing and dangerous situation developing to the left of the column. Where earlier there had been just a hundred or so white-clad hostiles on the ridges, there now were thousands. As the 655 sailors and Marines toiled along the ravines and over the ridges, the enemy multitude stayed abreast, keeping the American column between themselves and the river. In another half hour the force would arrive at the land end of the peninsula upon which the Citadel stood. There the Americans would have to change direction to the right to attack the final line of fortifications which the Citadel dominated. This change of direction would place the Koreans, now on the left, directly in rear of their column. Kimberly and Casey recognized the precariousness of their position, and Tilton was particularly concerned over the possibility of a trap. The abandonment of Fort Monocacy, the overwhelming numbers of Koreans paralleling the Landing Force, the powerful stronghold ahead could indicate that the Koreans planned to wait until the Americans attacked the Citadel, then launch their main effort from the American rear, smashing them in a classic pincer movement.

Improvising as the column struggled forward, Cdr Kimberly sent LtCdr Oscar Heyerman with "A" Co, Master John Pillsbury with "F" Co and Lt Snow with his section of artillery to the crest of a hill overlooking the route of march to protect the rear of the force. He then ordered his Second-in-Command, LtCdr Wheeler, who commanded the Landing Force reserve, to the top of another hill a quarter mile further along towards the Citadel. Wheeler took Master Drake with

"B" Co, and 3 pieces of artillery under the command of Lt W. W. Mead to the crest of the hill with him. With the heights above them commanded by the far-shooting and accurate artillery, the members of the Landing Party felt more secure.

The Force now moved on with all the rapidity the heat-debilitated men could muster, with the red-faced and sweating Marines searching anxiously for the outer works of the fortifications they knew lay somewhere ahead in this incredibly chopped-up terrain. At last Tilton called a halt, judging that his skirmishers had reached a point about one-third of a mile from the Citadel. The men were exhausted and a

number had fallen from the heat. It was necessary to rest them even though several thousand Koreans were pressing in from the rear. The all-important question was: could Heyerman and Wheeler with 3 companies of infantry and 5 pieces of artillery effectively block the movement of the Koreans against the rear of the Landing Force?

As soon as the men had been rested momentarily, Tilton ordered his skirmishers to push on cautiously until the Marines reached a ridge just separated by one other from the conical hill upon which the Citadel stood. In order to get to the last ridge it was necessary for the Marines to cross about 30 yards of


open ground. Just to the right and front of the Marines' position stood a line of Korean banners planted on a path leading to the Citadel. Tilton assumed that these banners were placed in that position to decoy the American forces into the open, and decided to use this to his own advantage. The Marine captain, with several of his men, bravely rushed to the row of pennons and pulled down about 15 of them before the defenders in the Citadel loosed a tremendous hail of bullets. The Marines' actions had evidently been too sudden for the Koreans, for none of the Marine decoys was hit, and as soon as the firing slackened off, Tilton gave the order to rush for the next ridge. Most of the muskets of the Koreans in the fort being empty, the Marines made it across the open ground to the final ridge with but one casualty. Pvt Dennis Hanrahan of the *Alaska* fell dead from a Korean musket ball.

Now the Marines had some cover from the firing from the fort, and by lying in concealment in the grasses and undergrowth of the ridge they could place deadly fire from their own long rifles into the fort, now about 125 yards away. (Although the rifle-muskets the Marines carried were muzzle-loaders of Civil War vintage, their accuracy was excellent under ideal conditions. In tests made by the Ordnance Department in the 1860s with a similar rifle, a string of fifty 500-grain bullets with 60-grain powder charges was fired from a machine rest, and at 200 yards achieved a vertical group of 4.4" and a horizontal group of 3.4". At 300 yards, however, the size of the horizontal and vertical patterns more than doubled.) The main body soon came up, and under cover of the Marines' fire charged forward to take their place in the firing line along the ridge. The layout of the Korean defenses could now be plainly seen from the American lines.


The Citadel itself was a circular redoubt with walls of earth, stone, mortar and mud sitting atop a cone-shaped hill. Its interior diameter didn't exceed 60 feet, and it was used, because of its height, as a command post for the complex of forts on the lower reaches of the river. It was occupied now by O Chaeyon, Lieutenant General of the fortified



Marines on the walls of Fort Monocacy just after its capture



Aerial photo of Fort Monocacy taken in 1954



Aerial photo (1954) of the scene of final action

island of Kangwha-do and his bravest and most trusted officers and men. The side of the hill towards the American positions formed a steep slope starting from the bottom of a ravine and connected with the wall of the fort so closely that it was difficult to tell where the slope of the hill ended and the fortification began. Below the Citadel, on the same land projection, were 2 more fortifications; one of which was constructed on a projection of rock on the south side of the peninsula, the other at the waterline on the north side of the peninsula, both being armed with cannon of a wide range of age and caliber. (It is entirely probable that the sailors and Marines of the Asiatic Fleet enjoyed the dubious distinction of having been fired upon by the oldest artillery still in use in the world. A close study of 5 of the bronze cannon captured by the Landing Force and brought back to the US revealed that 2 had been cast in 1313 A.D., one in 1607, one in 1665, and one in 1680.)

As the main body found firing positions on the ridge and began sniping at the defenders in the Citadel, the crashing roar of large guns from the rear told of the fight that Heyerman, Wheeler and their artillery were making against the large forces attacking the rear. A few minutes before, hundreds of heads began appearing over the crest of a hill about 500 yards to the west of

Wheeler's position, and balls from muskets and jingalls started zinging around the sailors. Twice waves of white-garbed figures surged over the top of the hill and headed down the slopes toward the American rear guard, and twice the roar of the 5 pieces of artillery and the crack of the sailors' carbines drove the Koreans back with heavy losses. The grape shot, canister and explosive shells terrorized the orientals. The American rear seemed to be safe.

The fight at the Citadel had increased in intensity. The shells from the *Monocacy* exploding over and in the walls of the Citadel and the water forts, had killed many of the defenders and the rifles and carbines of the Marines and sailors firing from 100 yards away were killing many more. The Koreans, tough fatalistic fighters, must have known that they had little chance for survival. They began to expose themselves recklessly over the parapet of the fort from the waist up, and from inside the walls came a dirge-like death chant that chilled the American fighters.

At exactly 1100 Kimberly ordered the Signal Officer, Mr. Houston, to signal the *Monocacy* to cease firing. At 1115 Silas Casey gave the order for the assault, and the entire line of 350 sailors and Marines rose up with a thunderous yell and started down into the ravine separating the 2 hills. Tilton and his Marines were on the extreme right, and Lt Hugh McKee,

with Co "D," and Master McLean, with Co "G" were on the extreme left.

The Americans plunged down the slope, some losing their footing and falling headlong down the steep incline, others stopping momentarily to get off a hurriedly-aimed shot at the walls looming above them. The defenders were now standing in full view on the parapet, discharging their muskets down on their attackers. Jingall "teams" would mount the wall, the man carrying the muzzle kneeling down to depress the musket's aim into the ravine below, while the "shooter" would touch off the piece while it rested on his shoulder. Their muskets and jingalls empty, the Koreans picked up rocks and pieces of debris and flung them down on the forces struggling up the hill. But although the Koreans in the Citadel matched in numbers the sailors and Marines fighting their way up the side of the fort, nothing seemed to slow the Americans. On they came with dirty, bearded faces streaked with sweat, their mouths open as they gasped for breath, their teeth gleaming in sun-reddened faces.

Pvt Michael Owens of the *Colorado*, clambering up the hill a few yards ahead of the rest, was only 40 feet from the walls when he fell with a bullet in his groin. Seth Allen, a landsman from the *Colorado* was well ahead of the charging attackers and almost to the walls of the fort when he was struck and killed by a crude ball. The ranks kept coming, up to the stone walls, broken in places by the shelling of the *Monocacy*, and over the parapet and into the fort itself, locking hand-to-hand with the crazed defenders. Lt Hugh McKee, at the head of "D" Co, was the first American to stand on the parapet. As he was about to plunge into the fort, a bullet from a Korean matchlock fired at point-blank range struck him in the upper thigh; another Korean sprang forward with a terrible lunge and pierced McKee through the body with his spear. LtCdr W. Scott Schley appeared on the wall as McKee started to fall and rushed to his aid. The tiger-hunter who had pierced McKee tore his spear from McKee's body and lunged at Schley, his spear passing through the cloth of the officer's coat between



Part of the Landing Force takes a short break


his left arm and body. Before the Korean could wrench it loose, Schley calmly shot him dead with his long-barreled navy pistol. In a second, a group of sailors formed a ring around Schley and the wounded McKee, forcing the Koreans back.

Elsewhere within the fort the fight raged on with savage intensity, the Koreans using spears, swords, knives, stones and even throwing dust in the faces of the Americans. The sailors fought on, after their guns were empty, with cutlasses and carbines used as clubs. The Marines countered the spears of the tiger-hunters with the bayonets on the end of their long rifles, then reversed the weapons and crushed heads with their rifle butts. Pvt Michael McNamara of the *Benicia* closed with a stocky Korean, wrenched his matchlock from his hands and clubbed him to death with it. Pvt John Coleman of the *Colorado* plunged into a group of Koreans surrounding Alexander McKenzie and dispersed them, saving the wounded McKenzie's life. Pvt. James Dougherty of the *Benicia*, spotting a soldier distinguished from the others by his hat adornments of peacock feathers and horsehair dyed red and yellow, correctly assumed this was the Korean commander. Dougherty fought his way to the side of the yelling, gesticulating commander and killed O Chaeyon, Lieutenant General of the Kangwha-do forts.

The focus of the fighting, after the main body of the Americans entered the fort, centered around the huge yellow standard of the fallen Korean commander. Capt Tilton, with Cpl Charles Brown of the *Colorado* at his side, charged for the flag to rip it from its pole. Seconds before they reached it, the wiry figure of Pvt

Hugh Purvis of the *Alaska Guard* was at the standard, unknotting the halyards. Tilton and Brown, ignoring the halyards, lunged at the flag and tore it from its lashings. Far below, cheers rang out from the *Monocacy* and *Palos* as the crews saw the first indication of how the fight inside the fort was going.

Now that flag was down and their commander killed, the remaining Koreans lost heart and began to retreat from the Citadel to the forts below. Tilton spotted this retreat and ordered one of his companies to cut them off. The Marines caught and killed many as they were scaling the parapet. Some who escaped the fort were shot as they ran down the ridge toward the water fort on the south of the peninsula. LtCdr Cassel's batteries on the ridge were quick to spot the fleeing Koreans, mowing them down in swaths with canister. Moving at full speed, the white-garbed figures tumbled head over heels as they were hit by rifle balls and exploding howitzer shells, rolling down the ridge into the water. A few, escaping the fire of the Americans, were seen to jump into the river where they were dragged under by their water-soaked clothing. Some



Pvt Hugh Purvis and Cpl Charles Brown with captured Korean flag



Cpl Brown, Pvt Purvis and Capt Tilton with captured battle flag

sat on the river bank and methodically cut their own throats.

At 1120 the battle was over. The American Flag flew from the east parapet of the Citadel, overlooking the river where all could see. Two hundred forty-three Korean corpses were strewn in and around the fort. On some, the thick layers of clothing smoldered and burned from the exploding powder of cannon shells, and the sickening stench of roast flesh filled the air. At least 100 bodies floated or sank in the river, which ran in crimson streaks here and there. Only 20 prisoners, all wounded, had been taken of the estimated 350-400 Koreans defending the works. The American losses were 2 killed and 9 wounded; 3 severely. (Lt. Hugh McKee died at 1745 that afternoon of the wounds he had received, bringing the number of dead to 3. The Citadel was renamed Fort McKee in his honor and

there is a plaque at the Naval Academy to his memory).

Success — Or Failure?

The Landing Force re-embarked the next morning at daybreak, with the Marines holding the beachhead against a possible enemy counter-attack, which never materialized. The Fleet remained at Boissée anchorage while recriminatory notes were exchanged between Minister Low and Korean officials which destroyed all hope of amicable relations being established as a basis for the treaty the Americans came to negotiate.

It is questionable whether even a master diplomat skilled in the ways of the East could have been successful in achieving the diplomatic objectives of the expedition. The time for opening Korea to the West was not yet ripe. Yet the failure was no less a failure because the odds were

stacked so heavily against it from the beginning. And nowhere was success so prerequisite to prestige as it was in the Far East of the 19th Century. Regardless of the odds, Low's futile efforts to reach an understanding with the Korean government caused American prestige to take a painful drop throughout the Orient.

In like vein, probably no comparable force could have executed a neater, more overwhelmingly decisive military victory than the officers and men of Rodgers' Fleet did during those 2 days in June, 1871. As a limited tactical operation it went off almost without error. But as a strategic effort to force the success of Low's mission, it was worse than useless. Less than 3 miles of the 70 miles of river defenses to Seoul were breached. A few hundred easily replaceable Korean soldiers were killed. The walls of 5 quickly reconstructed forts were destroyed, and at no time did the King of Korea feel his country sufficiently threatened to even send an accredited envoy to negotiate with the American representative.

On 3 July 1871, the Asiatic Fleet sailed from Korea to Chefoo, China. Throughout the East the officers and men were saluted by the fleets of the European Powers for their success in arms, and toasted for their gallantry by the gentlemen and ladies of the diplomatic and merchant colonies of the Station.

But throughout the East, the Princes and Mandarins must have permitted themselves small, secret smiles as they sipped their tea.

USMC MC



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DOG'S BEST FRIEND



✪ *In the mail bag the other day came an interesting letter we thought you might like to read. There is no tactical or practical lesson to be learned from this letter other than proving the fact that "all" transfers are not processed through an MRI machine and that in the Marine Corps VIP treatment is not necessarily confined to Very Important "People." Every dog has his day and in this instance Skoshi found that dog's best friend is man. Only minor editing was done in order to preserve the warm, human feeling and sincerity the writer was trying to convey. — ED.*

Dear Sir,

I am writing this letter to give my thanks and appreciation to certain officers and enlisted men of the Marine Corps and Navy although it is long overdue.

This letter is my only means of contacting these people. I don't know where to start, but I will try my best.

It all started about June of 1954 after my transfer from Able Co to Charlie Co of the 1st Bn, 1st Marines. In Charlie Co they had a dog who was their mascot. Skoshi was her name and she was a very remarkable dog. Although she was a Co mascot, she would choose her master — she was a one-man dog. Well, within 2 months I saw her lose 2 masters because they were rotated back to the States, and I thought she

would die. After that—I don't know how it happened—Skoshi chose me for her master, and believe me that made my hitch in Korea much more pleasant. Like they say, man's best friend is a dog.

While I was in Korea they had a division dog show and I entered Skoshi in it. She won 2 trophies: one for the smartest dog in the show and the other for the best and finest dog in the show. She was a real Marine. She made every problem and hike that Charlie Co had, from July 1953 to March 1955. She held the rank of Sgt.

Then came the day that I was to be rotated. It was hard for me to say goodbye to her. We boarded trucks and headed for Inchon. I was in Inchon for one day and said the heck with it all—I'm going to try to smuggle Skoshi into the States. My first move was to try to get in touch with my Bn Cmdr. From Inchon, I couldn't get a straight line to call the Col, so I called Able Med. Some corpsman answered and I asked him to relay a message for me, which was:

To Bn Cmdr, 1st Bn, 1st Marines

Please send my dog Skoshi to Inchon (Able Co compartment). I have draft commander's permission to take her back to the States.

Thank you,

Pfc Joseph Benbenek, Jr.

Next morning she was in a jeep. The Bn Cmdr and Bn Exec sent her to Inchon, a distance of 75 miles.

The next morning we were going to board ship at 0600—Skoshi had 5 puppies at 0400. It was bad enough to smuggle her, let alone 5 puppies. Well, I had to get rid of the puppies.

With the help of a Sgt and Cpl, I got her aboard ship in an air cooled sea bag. We put her in a sea bag with a cardboard lining and put holes in the seabag. We were aboard an MSTs ship. We were about 3 days out and I didn't think I could hide Skoshi for the entire trip without the ship's crew knowing it, so I decided to face the music and see the Capt. Believe me, you never saw 2 more surprised guys: the Capt laughing because he didn't know how I possibly got her aboard, and myself when the Capt called the ship's carpenter and told him to build a doghouse back aft on the quarterdeck.

We finally hit San Francisco and when we docked, a couple of Army veterinarians boarded the ship and examined Skoshi. She was all right, so I flew her to Buffalo NY which is my home. She is still there.

It took her about 6 months to get accustomed to civilian life. Since she has been in the States she has had 2 litters of pups—11 pups in all.

Well, this is my story and if you could possibly print it, I would greatly appreciate it. Skoshi was a friend to many a Marine and I know they will be anxious to hear about her. Also, if you do print this, I would like to contact all members of the 2d Machine Gun Section, C Co, 1st Bn, 1st Marines, in 1954 and 1955. I would like them to write me to set a date for a reunion.

Thank you.

Very truly yours,
Joseph Benbenek, Jr.
4641 N. Sheridan Rd., Apt 311
Chicago, Illinois

PS: Enclosed are a couple of pictures of Skoshi and the trophies she won in Korea.

✱ THE CLOSING PARAGRAPH OF THE "Radio Relay" article published in the October issue of the GAZETTE stated, "The present (radio relay) equipment has very definite limitations, but with the new AN/TRC-27, the span of the radio relay system will be almost limited to the imagination of the planner." This statement is misleading and when the capabilities and limitations of the new equipment as discussed herein are understood, this fact will be apparent to the reader.

With the phasing of the AN/TRC-27 into the MarDiv, 3 major advantages over present radio relay equipments will be realized—a frequency band little used by other facilities, lightweight equipment and more channels per set. With the acquisition of the relatively clear frequency band there also have been problems acquired that were not present with previous equipments. The October radio relay article failed to clearly point out the limitations of radio relay equipment. A great number of capabilities were pointed out—some 50 per cent or more are not equipment capabilities, but planning capabilities for some 10 years in the future.


The planners must face reality in planning for future employment of radio relay equipment. The possibility, or probability, of using any radio frequency radiating devices, such as radio relay equipment, during the movement of a Naval Task Force under actual or simulated tactical maneuvers will depend upon several factors. Among the factors to be considered is the possibility of an enemy intercept of any part of a radio or radar transmission that would eventually lead to the exact location and size of the Task Force. Radio silence must of necessity be more thoroughly enforced now and in the future than has been the policy in the past, because of the technical advances in direction finding and analysis equipment.

Another reason for enforcing radio silence is the possibility of an enemy possessing weapons capable of homing on radio or radar transmissions from the Task Force. This concept regarding radio silence indicates that commanders must utilize the other means of communication available to the Task Force, either

visual or personal contact. Personal contact, of course, is the ideal method to receive changes in the tactical or intelligence situation and with helicopters available this method of contact is comparatively easy to accomplish. Helicopter messenger must be utilized to the maximum extent, both afloat and ashore, and must particularly be available during the time required to site and install the radio relay facilities ashore.

A discussion of the features, capabilities and limitations of the AN/TRC-27 will reveal that this equipment is not a cure-all for the communication problem. This equipment is intended to provide facilities for linking as many as 8 telephone circuits by means of a two-way microwave radio link over a ten-mile, line of sight path. Basically it consists of a transmitter-receiver unit; 2 multiplexer units, each capable of providing 4 duplex channels; a 20-foot antenna mast with a single paraboloid reflector and diplexing horn capable of simultaneous transmission and reception; and a gasoline-engine generator. The total weight of a complete basic unit is approximately 250 pounds and may be carried in 5 man-pack loads.


When the AN/TRC-27 was conceived some 6 or 7 years ago, the design of the system did not take into



more about **RADIO RELAY**

By Capt H. A. Green and
1stLt J. A. Fullinwider

These authors want to amplify and
clarify our October article on radio relay



AR/TWC-VT TYPICAL OPERATION

account the long ranges which would be required under the concept of widely dispersed units. The design range is 10 miles and this range is strictly limited to "line of sight." Greater ranges are possible if line of sight conditions can be met, perhaps through the use of tall buildings, water towers, etc., as transmitting sites. In addition, plans may be made to acquire real estate between units, provide such real estate with adequate security and install relay points to extend the range. No obstacles, such as trees or terrain features, can be between the transmitting and receiving antennas. In the past, so called "line of sight" equipments could, under certain conditions, provide communications over distances of several hundred miles simply because these radio signals followed the curvature of the earth. This phenomenon is possible because of the refractive quality of the earth at certain frequencies. This so called "line of sight" equipment could, to a certain extent, also provide communication to or from those areas that were behind hills or other obstacles—this is primarily the result of the diffraction of the radio waves at VHF-UHF frequencies. These phenomena are familiar to most communication officers and unit commanders because this type of reception is possible with present organic radio relay equipments. This is not possible with the AN/TRC-27 radio relay sets. The reflective and refractive effects on the frequencies employed with the new radio relay equipment do not assist in extending the communication range of this equipment but strictly hold it to line of sight paths.

Another factor encountered with this equipment and not encountered, to such a degree, with the older equipments is the absorption of the

radio waves passing through vegetation along the path of the transmitted waves. The fact that vegetation absorbs radio waves at these frequencies will call for a new concept in drawing profiles for the establishment of the radio relay link. In addition to considering hill masses in the propagation path, the radio-relay officer will be forced to determine the height of trees along the ridge lines and in many cases may need to eliminate such vegetation in order to establish a radio relay link. This will mean that reconnaissance by helicopter or other suitable means will be a "must" rather than a "nice to have" item in the procedure for establishing radio relay circuits. Another problem encountered in the operation of the AN/TRC-27, because of the much higher frequency used, is the tendency for buildings and other man-made objects to cast sharp shadows and if the surface of such objects is smooth, even to reflect the radio waves in a new direction.

Now, with some of the problems of micro-wave frequency transmissions such as used with the AN/TRC-27 system exposed, what are some of the methods that can be used to insure that adequate communication is obtained?

The first and most important problem is siting the equipment. As mentioned earlier, micro-wave frequency transmissions are limited to line of sight paths.

Siting is the practical application of all the known factors involved in the establishment of a radio relay link. It is possible to set up links from hilltop to hilltop without regard to any of the problems mentioned previously and this system might work but the chances of satisfactory and efficient operation are remote.

Siting may be done by a number of methods or combination of methods. It may be possible to establish a reasonable path by the use of contour maps, aerial photographs and other survey data available to the radio relay teams.

Generally the sites are tentatively chosen by the use of contour maps and a ground or aerial survey is made to verify the suitability of the choice of locations. The best method appears to be a helicopter reconnaissance over the chosen path with a landing at the terminal and relay points to verify the type of terrain and the amount of clearing of vegetation and removal of obstacles required to make the selected areas suitable for their intended purposes.

Some points to be considered in the survey of prospective relay or terminal locations are accessibility for resupply, the extent of area to be cleared, the length of wire lines needed to connect into the command post, and the height of the antennas which might be required to clear any local obstacles in the direction of the distant transmitting and receiving locations. It is desirable to pick more than one possible site from a contour map so that if one site is unsatisfactory, another may be chosen immediately. In most areas the aerial inspection will definitely be required since contour maps do not show the height of trees. Bare areas may be planted fields at certain times of the year and may be in the direct line of sight path, absorbing some of the radio frequency energy required at the receiving antenna. Maps do not always show man-made objects, or such objects may have been erected after the maps were printed. Sites and paths around or near high-power electrical transmission lines must be avoided.

The reduction in size and weight of the AN/TRC-27 is due mainly to the reliance on a highly directive, narrow beam (6 degree) high gain antenna, to beam transmission to another set or to receive this beam from a distant set. This highly directive, narrow beam feature is also a serious limiting factor in the employment of the "27" equipment, but the narrow beam does afford greater inherent transmission security. For shipboard use this type antenna system would require a complex align-



Capt Green's experience in the field of military communications spans some 18 years. He enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1939 and was commissioned in 1952. He has served as a Regimental and Group Communications Chief; Wing Radio Officer for the 1st and 2d MAW; Asst Communication and Supply Officer of 1st Anglico, FMFPac. He is presently serving as Radio Officer, MCEB, MCS, Quantico, Va.



AN/TRC-27 — Field Installation

ment system to ensure that 2 antennas, on separate ships, were in alignment and also within a line of sight path. This alignment system is not impossible to obtain. However, no such system is now in existence for this equipment. Such a signal seeking type of alignment system would be complex and susceptible to all the ills inherent in any electro-mechanical configuration.

If this radio relay system is to be utilized in the movement ashore, a signal seeking type of antenna alignment system would be required both ashore and afloat to maintain contact. When all units of the landing force have moved ashore, the radio relay system could be installed without the use of any automatic alignment system for the antennas.

It appears that the interim solution to this ship-to-shore communication problem is to utilize the presently available AN/MRC-62 and 63

equipment until such time as a micro-wave system is developed that can provide this service. Once communication is established to a shore station with the presently available system, it is possible to inter-connect the old and the new systems at the audio level.

With so many apparent limitations, why is a micro-wave system to be adopted? Communication personnel, and others to a varying de-

gree, are aware of the problems of finding interference free radio frequencies for training purposes in the US. Many frequencies have been assigned for multiple use by commercial television stations, radio stations, law enforcement agencies, marine radio and many others and, unfortunately for the Services, have placed serious limitations on the use of some very fine military radio equipment. The narrow beam micro-wave link will alleviate the interference problem to a large extent thus enabling the use of radio relay to a degree unknown in previous exercises which utilized such equipment as the AN/TRC-3 or 4 and the AN/MRC-62 or 63.

The advent of the "27" should provide the Marine Corps with a much needed radio relay system that will do a number of things well; some things not at all. As with all communication equipments, the communication officer and the commander must be completely aware of its capabilities and its limitations, to employ it to the maximum extent possible. As in the past, adequate reconnaissance, if possible, and a well formulated plan will assure that the communication system will provide the rapid transmission of accurate, timely information to aid in the success of the mission assigned. Of course, the communication plan must be supported by properly trained personnel and adequate equipment. If the communication officer has the proper balance between planning, personnel and equipment there is no reason why he should be "red-faced" at the critique. The use of the "27" will definitely require this balance to be effective in fulfilling the commander's communication requirement.

USMC



Lt Fullinwider enlisted in the Marine Corps in 1940 and was commissioned in 1952. His entire commissioned service has been devoted to the field of radio-electronics. He teamed with Capt Green to write this article to "clear up some of the issues involved in the concept of employment of radio-relay."



THE RESERVE SKILLED TECHNICIAN

✿ I&I 5TH INFBN, DETROIT, MICH. — "Look the situation over," is a familiar phrase to Marines. The very fact the Marine Corps is constantly looking the situation over through its planning boards, equipment testing and experimental teams is why they always have the situation well in hand. I believe it would be feasible at this time to institute a survey of all Marine Reserve establishments to ascertain how compatible the missions of the various units are to each community's industry and personnel situation. Since the establishment of many units, areas have experienced population changes and industrial build ups and shifts. Close affinity of the unit's mission to the general background of an area, I believe, would greatly increase the overall value of the organization to the Marine Corps and the community.

Some cities, known to the world as the titans of American industry, have only infantry type units located in their vicinity. Beyond question the infantry is the back-bone of the Marine Corps; because of it and for it, the various and sundry other organizations exist.

Pertaining to the Reserve Program, though, I believe consideration should be given to full exploitation of the materials at hand (another familiar Marine Corps phrase). These cities that have made the US the industrial giant of the world, possess a rich crop of talent that only needs harvesting. A unit more appropriate to the area could well be the means of reaping this harvest for the Marine Corps Reserve. Consider the unlimited wealth of technical knowledge available in these cities. Automotive men, experienced in all echelons of transportation repair and maintenance; electronics men trained in many spheres of communications; engineering person-

nel skilled in the varied techniques of that profession, to mention only a few that are available in these areas.

It is a known fact that skilled men will be more interested and apply themselves to any project that is a challenge to their knowledge and capabilities. Training that tends to become routine or does not involve the application of a skill holds little interest to many men. The establishment of a Motor Transport Unit, Engineering Unit, Communications or Signal Maintenance Unit, Tank, Amphibious Tractor or Shore Party Unit in these industrial areas would be a benefit to the Marine Corps. Consideration could also be given to a composite unit composed of platoons or companies of the types mentioned above. Presenting an opportunity to these skilled men to apply their various knowledge and abilities, will greatly increase recruiting lure. The establishment of a unit closely associated with the industrial endeavors of the cities would be a fine aid to public relations and for the developing and maintaining of skilled personnel for the Marine Corps. The units would be truly representative of their respective areas. The prospects for increasing the already established fine prestige and community relations of the units are unlimited.

MSgt J. H. McDermott

THE 6-MONTH PROGRAM

✿ T AND R COMMAND, CAMP PENDLETON, CALIF. — Is the 6-month training program in the Marine Corps Reserve being utilized to its maximum potential?

At present, these 6 months of active duty training are geared for turning out a well grounded basic Marine infantryman. This it is doing and doing it well. If all our Reserve units were infantry this training would be sufficient, but in view of the many combat support and support units comprising the Reserve, it

is not. Those support units with their varied MOS requirements are not reaping the full benefit of this program because the man returning from the 6 months training still has to be trained in a particular occupational specialty.

Before proceeding further let's see just what this training consists of. The training progresses through 3 phases: 1) Boot Camp; 2) Individual Combat Training and 3) Five weeks of Advanced Combat Training. The first 2 phases of the program are exactly the same as the regular enlisted Marine goes through — the third phase is where the difference between regular and reserve occurs. The 6-monthers continue through a 5 weeks advanced combat course while the regular is assigned to a school or a unit and proceeds to learn an MOS. This MOS will serve as a guide during his Marine career, be it short or of 20 years' duration.

The young reservist meanwhile has completed 5 weeks of training and is returned to his parent Reserve unit without acquiring any particular MOS outside of basic infantry.

He must now be trained in a specialty at his home armory. The training time there consists of 48 drills (of 2 hours each) per year and 2 weeks of summer camp. When this time is further broken down into required subjects and administrative matters, it leaves very little actual time for training in an MOS. To some it may occur that I am placing too much importance on the MOS. Yet, without men trained in these MOSs, a Reserve unit is just a group of basic ready reservists and not a unit capable of accomplishing its assigned mission if called to active duty. Since the time available for specialist training in a Reserve unit leaves a lot to be desired, wouldn't the 5-week advanced combat training phase be utilized better if it were devoted to training in an MOS required by the parent Reserve unit?

As an example let us take an Engineer Company which has need of many varied MOSs in the 1300 field and particularly of heavy equipment operators (1345). This unit sends 5 men to 6 months' training on the west coast. After completing individual combat training at Camp Pendleton, they are assigned to on the job training at Force Engineer Battalion. After an intensive 5 weeks of training on dozers, cranes, graders, etc., they are returned to their home town Engineer Company. They can fit

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The GAZETTE will pay \$15.00 for each letter published in the Observation Post

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right into a billet in the equipment platoon and can proceed to become more proficient in their MOS and also be of value as instructors. Under a program of this type, these men would be doubly valuable to the Marine Corps and themselves. To the Marine Corps because they are making the Engineer Company a better prepared unit T/O wise and to themselves because they have an MOS in which they can advance themselves.

This 5 weeks of training might not seem worth the administrative effort it will take to set it up, but the effort is justifiable in view of the value to be received. This administrative effort is simplified by a number of factors. These men complete individual combat training at bases where most MOSs can be taught. All Reserve units know 6 months in advance their quota for a particular month. As an example let us take all Engineer and Shore Party units east of the Mississippi. In June of 1958 they have a combined total of 18 as a quota. These men will report about the same time and continue through their training together, finishing up with 5 weeks of on the job training at Force Engineer Battalion. The same policy would be in effect for all units in this geographic area having the same MOS requirements.

This may not be the ideal solution but I believe that if a program of this kind is undertaken, it will go a long way towards making a strong and more ready Reserve.

TSgt Daniel J. McManus

TO EACH, HIS OWN

I&I, 20TH INF CO, ROCKFORD, ILL. — I would like to take exception to the article which appeared in the November 1957 GAZETTE (A Touch of Tradition) concerning our present "traditions." Perhaps all the author said is and has been very true. Our uniforms have come through a very normal chain of events and the things which we have fabricated some "tradition" about may not really be "traditional" at all. However, I personally fail to see just what is wrong with such "tradition." Surely when you present such an item as the red stripe on the Dress Blues as a reflection of blood shed by Marines of days gone by, you create a believable picture in the eye of any new recruit. You give him the idea that before he can wear that stripe he must have earned the right by becoming an NCO. I remember when I was in boot camp it made a big impression on me and no doubt it does on a large majority of men. Matter of fact I still like to be-

lieve it could be the truth and have told countless audiences and individuals that story.

We of the Marine Corps represent what is one of the oldest and most romantic organizations in the US. Frankly we use the dress uniform to good advantage in recruiting efforts and in public affairs. When people see that uniform they are not in any doubt—there stands a US Marine. Are we now supposed to make it a point that we tell them that the uniform is just something which evolved from all other uniforms in the past? Not me—I am going to stick to the romantic and hope that everyone else does the same.

Based on the war and combat record of the Corps we do of course have factual items of tradition to capitalize on. However, even those have come under the "old soldier's eye" and in general don't quite tell the truth any more. I have probably heard a thousand stories about one Major in the Corps and I doubt seriously that he could have done all of the things they say. Men such as Daly, Wise, Quick, Diamond, and in more modern times Puller, Basilone, and on and on become more "fictional" and "traditional" with each passing year. Any of us who have talked to Marines of the First World War or the

"Old China Days" or even the very start of WWII have heard in fact what is now "tradition" but under careful scrutiny might turn out to be somewhat dressed up from the original. I have found that in my own mind things which happened in the Second World War and even as recently as Korea have been given that treatment.

Maybe I am just the kind of guy who hopes that all kids believe in Santa Claus and if that is bad, then I am stuck with it. Perhaps we should get very correct about this thing and tear down all this fabrication concerning the things mentioned. But before we do I would like to say that having been a Drill Instructor I have seen those fabrications and "semi-truths" put the Marine Corps emblem in the place of eyeballs of an awful lot of young men. I have also seen that look on little fellas at Cub Scout and Boy Scout affairs when you tell the stories. And last but far from least I have seen many a grizzled old Master Sergeant and hard nosed Senior Officer shamelessly cry on any 10 November during the various ceremonies. Just between us I think a lot of these "traditions" had something to do with all those things . . . and I hope it stays that way.

Capt P. E. Wilson

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The books listed below have been received recently by the GAZETTE for review. More detailed reviews of many of these books will appear in subsequent issues. These books may be purchased at the GAZETTE BOOKSHOP now. Association members who are interested in reviewing books should notify the Editor and Publisher.

THE CHALLENGE OF THE SPUTNIKS—*Edited by Richard Witkin. Doubleday & Co., NY.*

Paperbound \$1.50

This publication is the first of a new series of paperbound volumes to be known as Doubleday Headline Publications. Mr. Witkin, a reporter for the *New York Times*, has taken the words of President Eisenhower, Bernard Baruch, Edward Teller, Charles E. Wilson, Eric Sevareid, Thomas K. Finletter, and many others to show in broad perspective how America is responding to the Sputnik. The volume contains 4 parts: The Shock, The Reaction, The Race, and To The Stars.

THE FRENCH NATION: from Napoleon to Pétain, 1814-1940—*D. W. Brogan. Harper & Brothers, NY. \$4.50*

A sweeping picture of the events and the people in French political, military, artistic and social life during the last century and a quarter—the period which began with the fall of Napoleon and ended with the establishment of the Vichy Government. Mr. Brogan shows us France as a nation whose genius has not been eclipsed by the weakness of her government; a nation whose unified culture, despite her deeply and disastrously divided society, represents a triumph of Western civilization.

FIVE DOWN AND GLORY—*Gene Gurney; edited by Mark P. Friedlander, Jr. G. P. Putnam's Sons, NY. \$5.75*

This is a definitive history of the aces of the American air forces from WWI through the Korean conflict. From the bi-wing Jennys of WWI, through the Mustangs and Lightnings of WWII, to the sleek jets of Korea, this volume presents the sweeping, panoramic story of America's ace fighter pilots—war by war, theater by theater, service by service. Included also is a complete compilation of ace fighter pilot victory tallies. Made from official records for the first time, these tabulations represent the only complete listings of America's air aces to be found in publication today.

KAMIKAZE—*Yasuo Kuwahara and Gordon T. Allred. Ballantine Books, NY. Paperbound, 35¢*

Yasuo Kuwahara was 15 years old when he entered the Japanese Air Force in 1944. He was 17 when the war ended. He describes here his basic training and his first air battles. He tells of the first order for Kamikazes; of seeing his friends go, one by one to a certain death; of getting last orders himself. This is an original publication.

YUGOSLAVIA: East-Central Europe Under the Communists—*Robert F. Byrnes, Editor. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., NY. \$8.50*

Because of the unique position that Yugoslavia holds with relation to the Communist and non-Communist worlds, the statistical details concerning her government and her economy have a great significance for scholars in the West. Here will be found highly significant and detailed studies on the political and economic culture of this country: from the historical and geographical background to the various ramifications of government, economy, national security, education, economic, industrial and commercial factors, transportation, public health and welfare. This is another volume in the series planned by the Mid-European Studies Center, a unit of the Free Europe Committee.

HUNGARY: East-Central Europe Under the Communists—*Ernest Helmreich, Editor. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., NY. \$8.50*

Hungary is probably the key to the entire satellite problem, and perhaps to the basic conflict between East and West. The 18 chapters of this definitive volume were prepared by a group of noted scholars who have devoted their careers to the mastery of the field. What they have compiled is assuredly the last word in the intriguing enigma of modern Hungary. This is another volume in the series planned by the Mid-European Studies Center, a unit of the Free Europe Committee.

THE WINTER OF THE BOMBS—*Constantine Fitzgibbon. W. W. Norton & Co., NY. \$3.95*

In September 1940 the long-expected bombing of London began. By the following May the Blitz was over. What happened in that winter is an heroic, terrible, inspiring account. The author has drawn this story largely from the people who were there. He interviewed ambulance drivers, pub-keepers, government officials, housewives and cab drivers. He talked to veterans of the RAF and the Luftwaffe. He reviewed both British and German documents.

THE LONG FIGHT—*D. A. Rayner. Henry Holt & Co., NY. \$3.00*

This latest novel by the author of *The Enemy Below* is a fictional story based on fact—an account of prolonged action at sea. The action of this story was the culmination of a long series of events involving struggles between the British and French for possession of Mauritius in the Indian Ocean. In one instance the British frigate *San Fiorenzo* plows through a heavy storm to meet the French frigate *Piemontaise*. A running battle follows which lasts for more than three days and nights. The outcome is for the reader to discover.

THE CAT WITH TWO FACES—*Gordon Young. Coward-McCann, Inc., NY. \$3.50*

Mathilde Carré, known as "The Cat," was for some time an important figure in the French Resistance Movement and the mistress of one of its leaders. Yet within 48 hours of her capture by the Germans she changed sides completely, became the mistress of a Nazi counter-intelligence chief, and was busy denouncing her former friends to the occupation authorities. Later she was brought to England by the British Navy, the embarkation arrangements being carefully coordinated with the Gestapo. She had a sensational trial in 1949, and is now alive and free. The book is subtitled "*The Most Amazing Spy Story of the Second World War.*"

TOMORROW TO LIVE—William Herber. Coward-McCann, Inc., NY.

\$3.95

When young Mike Andreas left his estranged wife and their child to join the Marines, his primary motive was to escape from his domestic problems. Hot-tempered, sensitive and often unsure of himself, the rigorous routine of Marine training nevertheless proved no obstacle and he gained his commission. Before long, Mike found himself facing more problems than he ever had at home—problems involving the lives and deaths of himself and his men. This novel about the Marine Corps was written by a veteran who participated in WWII with the 2d Mar Div.

BRITISH BATTLESHIPS, 1892-1957—Cdr Randolph Pears, RN (Ret). The British Book Centre, Inc., NY.

\$10.50

When the *Vanguard* was paid off into reserve in 1956, it marked the end of an epoch of Britain's history: that of her sea power as embodied in her battle-ships. The introduction of the *Royal Sovereign* class in 1892 with their 13.5-inch guns, was the birth of the modern big-gun ship, as we have known it. Cdr Pears describes each class of ship in detail, and there is a full page photograph for every one. The author tells of the evolution of the class and something of the fortunes of the ships that comprised it. He also describes life in these ships at various periods. This constitutes a record of the Royal Navy's greatest ships, and an examination of its ways and traditions in the days of its greatest power.

MYSTERIES OF THE PACIFIC—Robert de la Croix. John Day Co., NY.

\$3.50

In the late 18th Century a French expedition sent to explore and map the Pacific vanished in that ocean. A century and a half later Amelia Earhart disappeared even more completely and mysteriously. The author recounts 11 real-life riddles beginning with the French expedition and ending with Amelia Earhart.

OPERATION SEA LION—Peter Fleming. Simon and Schuster, NY. Illustrated.

\$5.00

On 16 July 1940, Adolf Hitler issued Directive No. 16 which set forth his requirement for the invasion of Great Britain. The code name Sea Lion was given to this operation. This book is an examination of all the factors which led up to the projected invasion, the German plans for launching it and the British plans to repel it.

ALWAYS WITH HONOUR—Gen Baron Peter N. Wrangel. Robert Speller & Sons, NY.

\$5.00

The fight of those Russian soldiers who strived for the liberation of Russia in the dark days following Soviet seizure of power is memorialized by their last Commander-in-Chief in these memoirs. A tragic disunity in Russia, which Baron Wrangel steadfastly tried to eliminate, and a lack of realization by the Western nations of the dangers of Communism to the free world, along with errors of the first magnitude by Gen Wrangel's predecessors, combined to defeat the White Armies. The foreword in this volume is by Herbert Hoover.

EAST AFRICAN CAMPAIGNS—Gen Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck. Robert Speller & Sons, NY.

\$6.00


The man John Gunther calls "The Prussian Lion of Africa" tells the fasci-

nating story of his 4-year battle against tremendous odds as Commander-in-Chief in German East Africa during WWI. Although his country lost the war, von Lettow never lost a battle, never was defeated, was never forced to surrender. In his foreword, Mr. Gunther says, "Considering the odds and the difficulties, this German was one of the most extraordinary military geniuses of all time."

SECRET SERVANTS, A History of Japanese Espionage—Ronald Seth. Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, NY.

\$4.00

Ronald Seth is an expert on espionage wherever it is found. This volume is the result of his special interest in Japanese espionage activities. He has consulted hundreds of original Japanese documents and reveals here many facts and events never before published.



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The Legend of Normandy . . .

THE INVASION OF FRANCE AND GERMANY, 1944-1945 — Samuel Eliot Morison. 360 pages, photographs, maps, and index. Boston: Little Brown-Atlantic. \$6.50

Only professionals can understand what an albatross the legend of Normandy hung onto the amphibious art. With its amateurish magnitude, its clumsiness, its cascading publicity, its inflexibility, its glossed-over costly mistakes, its vast involvement of people (many very senior) who had never seen an amphibious operation and never would again, the Normandy assault seems destined, like the deadly upas tree, to wither by misleading precedent everything that falls within its long historical shadow. After reading Samuel Eliot Morison's distinguished *Invasion of France and Germany, 1944-1945*, you can readily see why. This eleventh volume of his soon-to-be-completed 14-volume *History of United States Naval Operations in World War II* covers the Southern France landings as well as bits and pieces of naval mopping up in the ETO, but the *piece de resistance* is Normandy.

The truth is, in the classic oceanic sense, Normandy, the much touted invasion, was hardly an amphibious operation at all — it was a gigantic stream-crossing which was an anachronism by the time it was completed. Nonetheless, the massive dead hand of Normandy still rests heavy on amphibious warfare, and self-anointed experts (not only American but British) still sagely announce, "There will never be another Normandy" — as if that disposed for all time of amphibious operations as a mode of maritime warfare.

Professor Morison (who is also a retired RAdm, USNR) does not directly address the foregoing notions in his assessment of Normandy, but his book (a typically Morisonian combination of tangy writing and impeccable historical technique) provides all the evidence required. Never has an operation been so slathered with superlatives by its participants and by posterity, too. For example, Adm Sir Bertram Ramsay's Order of the Day commenced, "It is our

privilege to take part in the greatest amphibious operation in history." Or Gen Omar N. Bradley's modest characterization of Normandy as "the mightiest of amphibious invasions." With such fuel to go on, Adm Morison can truthfully state, "... the fame of Normandy has eclipsed that of every other amphibious landing in WWII." This statement is likely correct, but the truly deserving reasons for Omaha's fame in amphibious annals ought to be better known.

Taking facts which are carefully substantiated and recorded in *The Invasion of France and Germany*, the Omaha Beach assault appears as the major landing operation in which . . .

Assault units missed 6 out of 9 of the planned beaches, in every case by more than a half mile, and some cases by as much as 2 miles. . . .

Landing craft had to wallow 11 miles in through 6-foot waves from transport areas located that far offshore by the planners to avoid the fire of one single battery (Point du Hoc) that afterward proved to have dummy guns. . . .

The naval gunfire support plan was gravely defective in almost every important aspect. . . .

The 8th Air Force intentionally dropped its 13,000 bombs 3 miles wide of the critically important beach targets because of a unilateral last-minute change in the air plan which no Air Force staff officer bothered to convey to the Navy or Army or the responsible commanders. . . .

Only 8 out of 16 planned beach-obstacle gaps were effected, and none of these was marked for the incoming landing craft. . . .

The inflexibly arranged ship-to-shore movement became so disorganized within 2 hours after H-hour that it had to be completely suspended. . . .

The much vaunted airborne envelopment by the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions lost more than 60 per cent of its equipment, and troops were scattered as far as 25 miles away from their planned drop zones (one airborne regiment required ten and a half hours after landing before it could collect 200 men in one place to capture an initial objective). . . .

Some operation, Omaha. Considering that the foregoing results were attained

as a climax of almost 3 years' planning, training, and advance publicity, maybe we should thank heaven there weren't 6 years' preparation instead.

After reading all this, you may well ask — how could any such landing possibly succeed? Adm Morison provides one thought-provoking answer: mostly because of the wholly un-planned, spontaneous intervention by heroic Navy close-in fire support ships which deep-sixed badly prepared plans in face of mounting disaster, and pitched in, promptly, with a weight of accurate, aimed fire which turned the tide, confounded the Germans, and even educated some of our own Army amphibious unbelievers (though not in time to help the brigadier general who, at the height of the beach slaughter, refused to let a Navy shore fire control party — the only one with working communications — call for help from the destroyers offshore because he thought naval gunfire was too dangerous. . . . !).

A second factor which turned the tide was the equally spontaneous boldness of several LCI skippers who rammed their fragile craft through mined beach obstacles and, once on the beach, had the guts and effrontery to take on emplaced German antboat guns with nothing bigger than 40mm — feats which must have inspired the anxious ghosts of Jones, Farragut, and Dewey.

By contrast with Omaha, *The Invasion of France and Germany* correctly portrays the adjacent landings on Utah Beach as well planned and capably executed, and so they were. It is too bad, however, that the book doesn't make a sharper point-by-point analytical comparison between the 2 landings which were so similar and yet so different in results.

And, speaking of comparisons, did Professor Morison make use of Adm King's devastating analysis of weight of planned fire support versus strength of enemy defenses, as between Normandy and the Marshalls? If this was cited or known to Adm Morison and his capable assistants, I must have missed it. As King's study pointed out, the results of the overwhelmingly successful naval gunfire and air support in the Marshalls had been known for months before Normandy, but tyro planners somehow failed to get the point.

Of the Southern France (Operation DRAGOON) landings, Professor Morison has little but praise, all well deserved. Here, at length, after a succession of previous Mediterranean amphibious assaults marked by inter-Service "... false doctrine, heresy, and schism," there was effective, well planned gunfire support, Air Forces that had finally decided to play the game, and a beautifully coordi-

nated, sensitively controlled ship-to-shore movement against 30 miles of beaches.

As may be realized, this volume is another amphibious one. Adm Morison has now written quite a few, reflecting the dominantly amphibious character of WWII, and his grasp of this mode of warfare has become increasingly sure (no doubt reflecting the advice and background of one of his principal colleagues, RAdm Bern Anderson, an experienced amphibian). One may quibble (as reviewers do) at occasional overstatements—such as that (which cannot have been carefully weighed) that the defenses of Iwo Jima “are not to be compared with” the crust of German beach defenses at Normandy. Or that Gen Bradley’s ghosted, anti-Navy, and amphibiously unsophisticated reminiscences are “the best single account of the Normandy operation.”

If, however, any such dictum as that last were true (which it emphatically is not), then readers may be greatly thankful that Samuel Eliot Morison has in this book provided us with an account of Normandy to which predecessors must defer and by which successors will be measured.

Reviewed by Col R. D. Heinl, Jr.

Ed: As Officer-in-Charge, Historical Section, HQMC, 1946-49, Col Heinl laid out and directed the Marine Corps historical program covering WWII. Subsequently, while on the staff of Marine Corps Schools (and still later while teaching at the British School of Combined Operations), he analyzed and lectured on aspects of the Normandy landings.

Lawrence of Arabia . . .

THE MINT—T. E. Lawrence. 250 pages. Doubleday & Co., NY. \$7.50

In 1922, disillusioned and mentally exhausted from his efforts to keep faith with the Arabs, Thomas Edward Lawrence enlisted in the Royal Air Force under the assumed name of John Hume Ross. Thus the legendary “Lawrence of Arabia” became a simple aircraftsman. A few years earlier he had held the rank of Colonel in the Army; he had been offered a knighthood for his services in the Great War; only a few months earlier in 1922 Winston Churchill, then head of the Colonial Office, had offered him any position he desired within Churchill’s power to give. But Lawrence was exhausted. He wanted all his thinking done for him. He wanted all his material requirements to be provided by someone else. And so, hiding his true identity (except from a few close friends at the top), he enlisted in the RAF.

As Aircraftsman Ross, Lawrence served

in the Royal Air Force at Uxbridge from August until December 1922, when he was posted to Farnborough. Here his true identity was discovered in January 1923, and he was discharged from the RAF. Through friends in the Army he was able to then enlist in the Royal Tank Corps under the pseudonym of T. E. Shaw. Although he made many friends in the Tanks he was miserable and wished only to return to duty with the RAF. Finally, in 1925, he was permitted to re-enlist in the Royal Air Force (under the name of Shaw) and was assigned to duty as an aircraftsman at Cadet College, Cranwell. He remained in the RAF in an enlisted status for the next 10 years.

This volume was written from the notes he kept while serving at the Depot at Uxbridge and at Cadet College. The bulk of it deals with his basic training at the former location. The short final portion pertaining to his duties at Cadet College almost transforms the book into the proverbial happy ending of an otherwise tragic account.

This is a revealing and brutal document of recruit training in the RAF shortly after WWI. But it was not Lawrence’s intention to write this in order to improve the recruits’ lot. In fact, because of the names involved he wrote that the book should not be circulated

until after 1950. In a letter to E. M. Forster he said that the book should not be published until that time because of “. . . the horror the fellows with me in the force would feel at my giving them away, at their ‘off’ moments, with both hands. . . .”

As a recruit at the Depot, Lawrence had little time to write. He describes it thus: “Every night in Uxbridge I used to sit in bed, with my knees drawn up under the blankets, and write on a pad the things of the day. I tried to put it all down, thinking that memory and time would sort them out, and enable me to select significant from insignificant. Time passed, 5 years and more (long enough, surely, for memory to settle down?) and at Karachi I took up the notes to make a book of them . . . and instead of selecting, I fitted into the book, somewhere and somehow, every single sentence I had written at Uxbridge. . . .”

In August 1927 at the Depot, Karachi, India, Lawrence began arranging the notes into sections, and a year later manuscripts and typescripts of *The Mint* were being read by a small group of individuals, including Bernard Shaw and Forster.

Four-letter words normally associated with recruit depots—and a few off-beat ones—abound in the book. They seem quite natural to the environment and

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the characters, and there is no feeling that Lawrence has put them in this account merely to produce shock effect. In fact, obscenity in any form was completely foreign to his nature. Although Lawrence participated fully in the RAF activities of his fellow aircraftsmen, there is frequently the feeling that he is two persons—one is a living character in his story while the other is an impartial observer on the sidelines.

Lawrence was much older than the average recruit at the Uxbridge Depot, and he managed to pass his enlistment physical exams only with the active help of highly placed friends. Despite this he was determined to keep up with his fellows in physical training as well as in all the dirty jobs recruits fell heir to. Keep up he did. But his account of the strain and agony he underwent is a sobering one.

It is amusing to read of his first visit to the canteen after beginning his recruit training: "... Round the halls hung tinted photographs of King George, Trenchard, Beatty, Haig, some land-girls, a destroyer at speed. Even there was a small picture of me, a thing later conveyed slyly to the ever-open incinerator. ..."

Those who are familiar with Lawrence's *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* will not find the same powerful drama in this volume. In the former he is dealing with war in general and guerrilla fighting in particular. Here he deals principally with recruit training. While it is lucid, biting and descriptive writing, writing which Lawrence could do so well, it could not possibly hold with the same strength. But anyone who finished reading *Seven Pillars* with a feeling of admiration for Lawrence, or with the desire to learn more about him, should certainly read *The Mint*.

There is in this volume a provocative account of Lawrence's participation in a motorcycle-airplane race. He treasured his powerful motorcycle and rode it whenever he had the opportunity. Here he relates the story of one of his rides in which he challenged an airplane to a race—and won! As the reader goes over the narrative of Lawrence having to occasionally "slow" to 90 on an English road, he can perhaps visualize more clearly the tragic day in 1935 when Lawrence suffered a fatal accident on a small English road while riding his beloved motorcycle.

Reviewed by LtCol John A. Crown

The Japanese Navy . . .

DEATH OF A NAVY—Andrieu d'Albas. 352 pages, illustrated. Devin-Adair Co., New York. \$5.50

"If I am ordered to fight without regard for the consequences," wrote Adm

Yamamoto in October, 1941, "I shall drive ahead for the first 6 months; but when it comes to the second and third year of the war, I have no confidence at all."

Capt d'Albas is in a unique position to recount the operations of the Japanese Navy which the inimitable Yamamoto so prophetically foretold. Fluent in Japanese, the French author spent several long tours in the Land of the Rising Sun. Thanks to his close acquaintance in Japanese naval circles, coupled with an intimate understanding of the culture, he has given us an unusual account to the Pacific war.

The energetic, raw material starved island people brought off the initial operations with training-maneuver smoothness. Pearl Harbor, the conquest of the Philippines, the East Indies, Malaya, and Burma . . . all went according to schedule. The Emperor's skilled pilots and sailors brought off one coup after another: the sinking of the *Prince of Wales* and the *Repulse*, the end of the combined US-British-Dutch fleet in the Battle of the Java Sea, then the death of 2 more British cruisers and a carrier off Ceylon. When Adm Nagumo's carrier force returned to Kobe in April, 1942, it looked back on a string of unbroken victories stretching from Pearl Harbor to Colombo. One thing alone remained as a potential threat . . . the US Fleet, not yet brought to decisive battle.

Instead of consolidating its far-flung gains, the Imperial Staff now looked further afield to the Aleutians, the Solomons, Samoa, and Midway. A decisive clash with the American carriers was to be sought. At Midway the fate of the Empire hung by the slender thread of Adm Nagumo's decision to refuel and rearm his planes for a second bombing of the Midway installations; his carriers were caught with their planes below decks. The *Akagi*, *Kaga*, *Soryu* and *Hiryu* were sunk. It was a blow from which the Imperial Navy did not recover.

The author is objective with his appraisal of the skillful and daring counter-operations of the Japanese fleet in the Solomons campaign. The Japanese cruiser and destroyer thrusts at Savo, Cape Esperance, Santa Cruz, and Tassafaronga are described in detail.

With the loss of the Central Pacific the Japanese fleet made one more massive effort in the Battle of the Philippine Sea. The reader can very well admire the resolution of the sadly reduced fleet. With pathetically few planes and half-trained pilots, it offered itself for the slaughter in the vain hope of luring the American carriers into a decisive action.

One last great ship remained. A last effort was made in fulfillment of the warrior code. The *Yamato*, most powerful surface warship ever launched, sailed out from Kyushu to meet the invading armada at Okinawa. She had fuel enough for a one way trip only. "This target was more than a powerful warship, the most wonderful of her kind that had ever existed; it was the Imperial Navy, it was Japan herself!" The *Yamato* weighed anchor on 6 April 1945. One day later, US carrier planes sank her.

It is difficult at best to follow the maneuvers of complex fleet actions, and here the author has struck a happy medium between accuracy and simplicity. What were the errors which led to the downfall of a major nation and the destruction of her sea and air power? Poor organization, inadequate reinforcements, and over-extended lines of communication and supply are part of the answer. Moreover, the Japanese made but amazingly slight preparation for a new shipbuilding program and little was done in the way of commerce protection. The quality of pilot training had been sadly reduced. With its veteran pilots gone, Nippon's half-trained though courageous fledglings were no match for the US flyers.

One thing more can be said: there is no substitute for industrial production as the fiber of any nation's might, and it is here that the Japanese militarists fatally miscalculated. Capt d'Albas has written an admirable account of a great sea power in the throes of defeat. The story is a tribute to the Samurai warrior spirit, in victory and in defeat.

Reviewed by Maj David Riley

ED: A Naval Aviator, Maj Riley served with VMF 216 during WWII in the Pacific.

Future Beachheads?

THE SOVIET FAR EAST—Erich Thiel. 388 pages, illustrated. Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., New York. \$8.00

A country where the soil is frozen, in some places, to depths of over 100 feet, where the frost heaves bridges out of alignment with the road and where thawing induced by the heat of a house sometimes causes water to well up in such quantities that it drives out the inhabitants, doesn't produce much in the way of travel literature. So forbidding, in fact, is much of the Soviet Far East and so tight the Soviet restrictions on visits by foreigners that literature of any sort on this vast subject is sparse and incomplete.

In an attempt to remedy this situation, Prof. Eric Thiel, economic geographer on the faculty of the University of Munich, has collected all available

source material in both German and Russian, sifted it for timely, reliable data and checked it against his own and other visitors' observations on trips through parts of the region. The result is a readable, well organized study of an area American fighting men have visited once in this century and which they may find themselves visiting again.

The area considered by Prof. Thiel comprises a band of territory of from 250 to 500 miles in width from Lake Baikal to Vladivostok and from Vladivostok to the Northern Coast of Chukotskiy. Included are most of the coastal regions likely to figure in any war between the US and the USSR.

Although intended as a physical and economic survey, Professor Thiel's study makes clear both the military strengths and weaknesses of the region. The dependence of the entire Soviet Far East on the security of a single railroad pass, that at Krasnoyarsk, the isolation and the utter dependence of dozens of coastal settlements on resupply from the sea, the difficulty of cross-country supply and reinforcement and, conversely, the obstacles of terrain and weather facing an invading force become apparent from the author's methodical presentation of historical, geological, climatological and economic data.

Before reading all, or any part of the book, it would be worthwhile to make a brief map study of the Soviet Far East as it is related to the rest of Asia, to European Russia, the Arctic and to the United States. Professor Thiel's 40 maps and diagrams are most helpful, but they are limited by format to too small an area.

Reviewed by William V. Kennedy

Ed: A military reporter and analyst, Mr. Kennedy is a 1st Lt in the National Guard (Armor).

An Incident in Asian History . . .

THE JAPANESE THRUST INTO SIBERIA, 1918—James William Morley. 390 pages, not illustrated. Columbia University Press, New York. \$6.00
World War II has caused the present

generation of Americans to be "Japan conscious." It fought a war to curb Japanese international banditry. It has witnessed Japan's progressive rise from its ashes, rebuilding its economic, moral, and, to some extent, its military strength. The methods, and mental processes, of the Japanese leaders, the forces (military, political, and economic) which operated to encourage Japan in its 1918 Siberian venture, and which led finally to her disaster in 1945 are, within limits, set forth in *The Japanese Thrust into Siberia in 1918*. It lays bare the truth—the fears, mutual suspicions, ignorance of conditions being set by the new forces of Communism on the part of the Allies, and in particular, the indecision and fumbling on the part of the US. It describes Japan's determination to take advantage of her Allies' war weakness, and the chaotic condition of Russia due to the Red Revolution, to extend her Asiatic plan of political, economic, and military control, to Siberia.

The Red Revolution suddenly, in fact unexpectedly, introduced the Siberian problem to Japan and the Allies. The Russian front against Germany dissolved, to the consternation of England and France, who were struggling desperately to defend the Western Front in France. They feared that Russian food and raw material would be made available to Germany, as well as German troops from the Russian (eastern) front. France and England's interest in Siberia was to set up an eastern front again and pressured Japan to send her army deep into Russia for that purpose. The US hesitated, at first, to approve such intervention.

Japan viewed the Siberian situation from her own position. Thousands of Hungarian and Austrian war prisoners in Siberia could be rearmed and bring a conquering Germany to Eastern Siberia opposite her shores. A hostile Bolshevik government could offer her a similar threat.

The Japanese military (and the Zaiatsu) with its clutch on the government saw their opportunity but, at the time, they were armed only with an idea

—Siberia was thrust upon them so suddenly that they were not prepared with a plan of action. In order to take prompt advantage of Russia's weakness in Siberia they had to solve certain national and international problems within a limited time.

The maneuvers of the wily pro-intervention Foreign Minister, Goto, successfully obtaining the "invitation" of France, England, Italy, and the United States to intervene in Siberia (aided by the unexpected "windfall" of the need to rescue 45,000 Czech soldiers from the Reds) and for Japan to exercise supreme command of the Inter-Allied expedition, is an interesting exposition of typical Japanese methods of negotiation by the "double entente."

The demands of England and France on Japan to reopen the Russian front were ruthlessly brushed aside. The Japanese won on all points and occupied that part of Siberia staked out as her own area of interest.

The Japanese Thrust into Siberia 1918 is an expansion of, and follows the form of, the chronicle located in the appendix. This unfortunately offers, to the reader, the Japanese objectives and plans piecemeal. The author has done an excellent and amazing amount of research among Japanese "available" sources, Russian reports, but unfortunately too few United States' and Chinese.

The author presents a scholarly and realistic (as far as his source material permits) commentary on a poorly understood incident in Asian history. A more balanced research would have enriched his efforts.

The reviewer, who was a witness on the scene, in Siberia, felt, after reading *The Japanese Thrust into Siberia 1918* as though he had attended a bountiful banquet, but regretted that the host had forgotten to serve the soup and the desert.

Reviewed by BGen J. F. Moriarty USMC (Ret)

Ed: In Siberia during the Japanese occupation and later on an intelligence mission, Gen Moriarty is well informed on the Siberian problem.



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
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
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
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